Gut Feelings Equals Objective?

[POI]

Otseng stated the following: "Objective morality is more an intuitive sense and it's not defined by a list of rules."

For debate: Seems Otseng is stating that if one has strong intuition(s) about something or things, it is objectively moral?

[otseng]

Clearly this pinpoints the reason we are back and forthing in this manner. ALL thinking is by nature subjective.

That's why I've been trying to focus on this. What I argue is things can exist objectively even though our thinking is subjective.

As you stated, you do not deny the existence of objective things. Otherwise you would be contradicting yourself.

It is not the same thing. For example, I acknowledge the Earth exists as an objective thing I (a mind) experiences through a human (form) the mind I am occupies (for the experience).

I do not say that the earth exists "only as a subjective experience my mind created" but that I -the mind - am within the experience of the Earth (and all that this entails).

How do you even know the Earth exists objectively? Shouldn't your logic apply to this case as well since all of our perceptions of reality depend on our subjective senses?

Therein I acknowledge no indication of morality present in the Earth or even the universe.
What I do observe is that the goings on (re Earth/Nature) are apparently absent of any sign of any objective source which you say your list examples as this supposed "objective morality" that "applies to all people at all times at all locations"

If a specific moral applies to all people at all times and at all locations, then by my definition it is objective.

To underscore this observation, if we remove humans from the planet altogether and try to pinpoint/locate examples of this "objective morality" that "applies to all people at all times at all locations" what would we find?

I am not defining objective morality as some independent entity. In this debate, I'm addressing this question: "Seems Otseng is stating that if one has strong intuition(s) about something or things, it is objectively moral?" I'm defining what I mean by objective morality and claiming we have objective morality. And I'm refuting the false attribution that just because we have a strong intuition about something makes it objectively moral.

One might argue that since this supposed "objective morality" "cannot apply to all people at all times at all locations if all those people don't exist on the planet" then we could tell from that, that people have to exist in order for morality to exist and therefore it is people who are objectifying morality into the environment and doing so through internal processes, suggesting that morality has an internal/subjective source rather than an external/objective source. Therefore, how can the claim that "objective morality exists and that it applies to all people at all times at all locations" be supported?

Of course morality does not apply to people that do not exist.

However, the idea that "morality exists and that it applies to all people at all times at all locations" is something we could agree with. I see/have been given no reason as to why one would need to add the word "objective' to that sentence.

Where objective morality comes in is where a specific moral value would apply universally. Yes, everyone has morals, but if there is no universal agreement on a specific moral, then it would be subjective.

[William]

[Replying to otseng in post #81]

And just because we think subjectively does not make everything subjective.

It does however, make everything we think about the objective, subjective.

No.

Yes.

Clearly this pinpoints the reason we are back and forthing in this manner. ALL thinking is by nature subjective.

That's why I've been trying to focus on this. What I argue is things can exist objectively even though our thinking is subjective.

Yes - I have been following your reasoning re that and asking you to give an objective example of morality which applies to all people at all times at all locations.

As you stated, you do not deny the existence of objective things. Otherwise you would be contradicting yourself.

It is not the same thing. For example, I acknowledge the Earth exists as an objective thing I (a mind) experiences through a human (form) the mind I am occupies (for the experience).

I do not say that the earth exists "only as a subjective experience my mind created" but that I -the mind - am within the experience of the Earth (and all that this entails).

How do you even know the Earth exists objectively?

I don't. I experience it as a real object and I treat it as if it does. I acknowledge that this applies to all people at all times at all locations.
How do you know morality exists objectively and applies to all people at all times at all locations? Do you experience such as a real object? If so, point the object out.

Shouldn't your logic apply to this case as well since all of our perceptions of reality depend on our subjective senses?

The interpretation of objects I perceive is done subjectively. Mindful interaction with these is a subjective thing which can be objectified/externalized. We are doing that now, with each other. We are minds interacting through the physical medium of what we experience as "Real" and the words we read from each other represent a means by which we can interact together while experiencing said medium. (The main medium we have re our human experience, is of course, our human bodies.)

Therein I acknowledge no indication of morality present in the Earth or even the universe.
What I do observe is that the goings on (re Earth/Nature) are apparently absent of any sign of any objective source which you say your list examples as this supposed "objective morality" that "applies to all people at all times at all locations"

If a specific moral applies to all people at all times and at all locations, then by my definition it is objective.

Your problem is in identifying any moral as the specific one you are saying you would identify as "objective". The definition of an objective morality you have given, appears not to enable you to achieve this. Your "If" remains an if, until your "Then" is shown to be the case.

To underscore this observation, if we remove humans from the planet altogether and try to pinpoint/locate examples of this "objective morality" that "applies to all people at all times at all locations" what would we find?

I am not defining objective morality as some independent entity.

If it is not "something" (an entity) how can you say it is an object? (btw what entity is truly "independent"? Is the Earth independant from the rest of the universe?)

In this debate, I'm addressing this question: "Seems Otseng is stating that if one has strong intuition(s) about something or things, it is objectively moral?" I'm defining what I mean by objective morality and claiming we have objective morality.

I am aware of this, yes.

And I'm refuting the false attribution that just because we have a strong intuition about something makes it objectively moral.

Yet, you haven't provided any evidence which refutes so have yet to fully refute the supposed "question". You have defined what you call "objective morality" and claim it is a false attribution that just because we have a strong intuition about something makes it objectively moral.

You have yet to show anything which informs us anything objectively moral. I observe that anyone having strong intuition about something can have that externalized. It happens all the time in human/earth experience.

Our words can be saved as objects if we write them down. You and I might agree that rape is wrong. We could come to an understanding of that agreement through reading what each other says about it -how we "feel" (strongly intuit) and why we think the intuition about it is valid as our interaction and subsequent agreement grows and allows us to reason together about it.
We could then develop ways in which our feelings and reasonings about rape can be externalised and have an effect on the way humans behave re what is acceptable and what is not.

One might argue that since this supposed "objective morality" "cannot apply to all people at all times at all locations if all those people don't exist on the planet" then we could tell from that, that people have to exist in order for morality to exist and therefore it is people who are objectifying morality into the environment and doing so through internal processes, suggesting that morality has an internal/subjective source rather than an external/objective source. Therefore, how can the claim that "objective morality exists and that it applies to all people at all times at all locations" be supported?

Of course morality does not apply to people that do not exist.

Is that all the takeaway you got from my words?

What about agreeing with me that "of course it is people who are objectifying morality into the environment and doing so through internal processes, suggesting that morality has an internal/subjective source rather than an external/objective source. "?

However, the idea that "morality exists and that it applies to all people at all times at all locations" is something we could agree with. I see/have been given no reason as to why one would need to add the word "objective' to that sentence.

Where objective morality comes in is where a specific moral value would apply universally. Yes, everyone has morals, but if there is no universal agreement on a specific moral, then it would be subjective.

Sure. That would be a logical conclusion we could apply to this (currently unspecified) "specific moral value would apply universally"
So tell me/us otseng - What is this "specific moral value" that has "universal agreement" that it is objective?

[otseng]

How do you even know the Earth exists objectively?

I don't. I experience it as a real object and I treat it as if it does. I acknowledge that this applies to all people at all times at all locations.

Then your argument that our subjective sense cannot make objective claims doesn't hold.

How do you know morality exists objectively and applies to all people at all times at all locations? Do you experience such as a real object? If so, point the object out.

I don't claim morality exists as an object.

Shouldn't your logic apply to this case as well since all of our perceptions of reality depend on our subjective senses?

The interpretation of objects I perceive is done subjectively. Mindful interaction with these is a subjective thing which can be objectified/externalized. We are doing that now, with each other. We are minds interacting through the physical medium of what we experience as "Real" and the words we read from each other represent a means by which we can interact together while experiencing said medium. (The main medium we have re our human experience, is of course, our human bodies.)

Yes.

Your problem is in identifying any moral as the specific one you are saying you would identify as "objective". The definition of an objective morality you have given, appears not to enable you to achieve this. Your "If" remains an if, until your "Then" is shown to be the case.

I was first defining what I mean by objective morality. Arguing if such a thing exists is a separate argument.

If it is not "something" (an entity) how can you say it is an object? (btw what entity is truly "independent"? Is the Earth independant from the rest of the universe?)

I've never claimed objective morality is an object. If it's not an object, then what is it? Philosophers have been arguing this for a long time and have no agreement on this. But this is not the point of my argument, but simply addressing intuition and objective morality and not addressing the ontological nature of morality.

And I'm refuting the false attribution that just because we have a strong intuition about something makes it objectively moral.

Yet, you haven't provided any evidence which refutes so have yet to fully refute the supposed "question".

I've refuted it by showing I've never stated such a thing and provided what I do believe.

You have yet to show anything which informs us anything objectively moral. I observe that anyone having strong intuition about something can have that externalized. It happens all the time in human/earth experience.

I've brought up several possible examples already.

You and I might agree that rape is wrong. We could come to an understanding of that agreement through reading what each other says about it -how we "feel" (strongly intuit) and why we think the intuition about it is valid as our interaction and subsequent agreement grows and allows us to reason together about it.

However, it's not because you or me might have "strong feelings" about something makes it objectively moral. I can have strong feelings against eating bananas, but that doesn't mean it's objectively morally wrong to eat bananas. And it doesn't even need to be a "strong feeling" either to make something objectively wrong. I might not have a strong feel towards not being unfaithful, but that doesn't mean it's not objectively wrong.

We could then develop ways in which our feelings and reasonings about rape can be externalised and have an effect on the way humans behave re what is acceptable and what is not.

It's obvious people do commit rape. They might have "strong feelings" to engage in it and then claim it's therefore acceptable. On what basis then can someone claim what they did was wrong?

What about agreeing with me that "of course it is people who are objectifying morality into the environment and doing so through internal processes, suggesting that morality has an internal/subjective source rather than an external/objective source. "?

No, I do not agree with that. Again, our subjective reasoning does not preclude something to be objectively true or to objectively exist.

So tell me/us otseng - What is this "specific moral value" that has "universal agreement" that it is objective?

I've already presented a potential list of items, so not sure why you're asking me this again.

[William]

[Replying to otseng in post #83]

How do you even know the Earth exists objectively?

I don't. I experience it as a real object and I treat it as if it does. I acknowledge that this applies to all people at all times at all locations.

Then your argument that our subjective sense cannot make objective claims doesn't hold.

Let's examine this supposed argument I made then.

How do you know morality exists objectively and applies to all people at all times at all locations? Do you experience such as a real object? If so, point the object out.

I don't claim morality exists as an object.

Then why even use the word "objective" with the word "morality"?

Your problem is in identifying any moral as the specific one you are saying you would identify as "objective". The definition of an objective morality you have given, appears not to enable you to achieve this. Your "If" remains an if, until your "Then" is shown to be the case.

I was first defining what I mean by objective morality. Arguing if such a thing exists is a separate argument.

Why not just define morality and leave out the word objective? Why bother to define something in that way, when it might not even exist? Of what use is the phrase "objective morality"?

If it is not "something" (an entity) how can you say it is an object? (btw what entity is truly "independent"? Is the Earth independant from the rest of the universe?)

I've never claimed objective morality is an object. If it's not an object, then what is it? Philosophers have been arguing this for a long time and have no agreement on this. But this is not the point of my argument, but simply addressing intuition and objective morality and not addressing the ontological nature of morality.

It appears an absurdity to be philosophizing over a concept which includes the notion of an objective thing within the acknowledgement of subjective thing (morality). What do you think the philosophy/philosophers are attempting to achieve? Perhaps, that there is "something" outside of us which is the source of our ability to moralise (to acknowledge that morals exist/we have morals)?

And I'm refuting the false attribution that just because we have a strong intuition about something makes it objectively moral.

Yet, you haven't provided any evidence which refutes so have yet to fully refute the supposed "question".

I've refuted it by showing I've never stated such a thing and provided what I do believe.

As POI wrote in the OP "Otseng stated the following: Objective morality is more an intuitive sense and it's not defined by a list of rules."

The statement itself seems contradictory. If it were written morality is a subjective thing to do with and internal (mindful) process (an intuitive sense) and is not defined by a list of rules" it would make sense.

POI Continues with "For debate: Seems Otseng is stating that if one has strong intuition(s) about something or things, it is objectively moral?"

It is debatable that the statement is a question even given that POI has ended it with a question mark.

Even so, it is understandable that POI makes the statement because it certainly does "seem" you are inferring such, given your (apparently unnecessary) inclusion of the word "objective" with the word "morality".

You have yet to show anything which informs us anything objectively moral. I observe that anyone having strong intuition about something can have that externalized. It happens all the time in human/earth experience.

I've brought up several possible examples already.

And I have commented on those examples already. Does this mean we have reach an agreement?

You and I might agree that rape is wrong. We could come to an understanding of that agreement through reading what each other says about it -how we "feel" (strongly intuit) and why we think the intuition about it is valid as our interaction and subsequent agreement grows and allows us to reason together about it.

However, it's not because you or me might have "strong feelings" about something makes it objectively moral. I can have strong feelings against eating bananas, but that doesn't mean it's objectively morally wrong to eat bananas. And it doesn't even need to be a "strong feeling" either to make something objectively wrong. I might not have a strong feel towards not being unfaithful, but that doesn't mean it's not objectively wrong.

Are you suggesting that eating bananas is a question of morality and equivalent to rape?
If not, I see no relevance in your reasoning above.

We could then develop ways in which our feelings and reasonings about rape can be externalised and have an effect on the way humans behave re what is acceptable and what is not.

It's obvious people do commit rape. They might have "strong feelings" to engage in it and then claim it's therefore acceptable.

I was not suggesting a strong feeling was all that was necessary. I also mentioned reasoning - in the sense of explaining why it is reasonable to have strong feelings about the wrongness of rape.
It is therefore not simply a case of having strong feelings about something to do with morality, which make those feelings "acceptable" but of having strong REASONING for why the feelings are relevant to morality and finer behaviour.
Therefore, even that a rapist might claim strong feelings about commiting rape, their then claiming it is acceptable would have to be accompanying with reasoning as to why such should be seen in that manner.
In the meantime, there is a strong history of reasoning as to why rape is NOT acceptable, which has gained the prominent position, because no reasonable argument has ever been presented by rapists, which makes rape actually acceptable.
On that basis it can be claimed that what rapists do, is wrong.

What about agreeing with me that "of course it is people who are objectifying morality into the environment and doing so through internal processes, suggesting that morality has an internal/subjective source rather than an external/objective source. "?

No, I do not agree with that. Again, our subjective reasoning does not preclude something to be objectively true or to objectively exist.

We (or at least I) am/are not talking about "something" external to ourselves, our reasoning or our sense of morality.
So what are you saying in the above statement? That morality does not exist as an external thing as is it is not observed in the overall nature of nature? Something else? How is your use of the word "objective" helpful in the context of morality when you also appear to be arguing that morality is not an objective thing?

So tell me/us otseng - What is this "specific moral value" that has "universal agreement" that it is objective?

I've already presented a potential list of items, so not sure why you're asking me this again.

I made that clear in prior posts where I commented on your list of things.

They are questions specific to morality. How are they questions specific to a supposed "objective" morality?

First on your list was the question ""Is it wrong to rape someone?"

The question is to a specific moral value ("Rape. is it right or wrong?") do you argue that there is universal agreement on the answer? Do you agree that the answer is objective or subjective? What makes a subjective thing an objective thing? What transpires as the process through which such is achieved?

[TRANSPONDER]

The fallacy is (as I think I have argued) is that morality must be objective (a sort of Cosmic Law) or it is invalid.

I argued that it is as valid as music, art, or literature, which are all human constructs, but are considered valid on their own terms.

Morality can even be traced to animal ethics, which are basic indeed (and aimed at survival, not 'doing good') but are all the objectivity that you will get or indeed need.

Incidentally, folks, this one popped into my head last night
A train approaches a fork and can’t stop. On the left, there are 10 newborns. On the right, there are 10 70-year-olds. Which way would a utilitarian go?

I recall this was made part of the 'Stargate - Atlantis' script where Rodney put it to his colleagues.



Here I found it

Of course any other options (stopping the train, jumping down and saving the baby) are not allowed.

There is an answer, but the polemic and indeed skewed aspect of the analogy can be identified.

It goes like this.

"A train approaches a fork and can’t stop. On the left, there is a baby on the track. On the right, there are 3 grown men. The only option is to let the train run over the baby or switch the points and let it run over the three men, who are also tied down. Which choice is morally right?" (the way this one is framed makes it polemically loaded, even more than it is).

"It depends."

"Depends? On what? Either your choice is right or wrong."

"Or no choice is right and both are wrong."

"That isn't possible - all choices are right or wrong, or morals are subjective."

"Well they are. It depends."

"On what?"

"whether the choice is utilitarian; pure logic. Better to save three lives rather than one. Of course if you make it ten old men or 10 babies, then the logic would say those old dudes has a life, the babies haven't had one yet. But there is the clue to the actual Right Answer in the form you set. We always save the one baby rather than three men."

"Why?

"Because of a universal law of empathy, never written down. Women and children first. In a sinking Titanic, burning building or hostage situation, nobody calculates the number of lives. There could be fifty men and 20 women and children. The Utilitarian numbers never apply, but the women and kids go first. We are creatures of instinctive empathy."

"Except where dogma overrides natural empathy, and regarding the other side as 'Wicked' justifies atrocities."

"Nailed it. And indeed the analogy knows this because it uses the sympathy - inducing baby. If it was ten men on one track and three men on the other, the choice , though unpleasant, is obvious."

[otseng]

I don't claim morality exists as an object.

Then why even use the word "objective" with the word "morality"?

Object and objective are two different things.

Why not just define morality and leave out the word objective? Why bother to define something in that way, when it might not even exist? Of what use is the phrase "objective morality"?

Because this thread is about "objective morality", not just "morality".

I've never claimed objective morality is an object. If it's not an object, then what is it? Philosophers have been arguing this for a long time and have no agreement on this. But this is not the point of my argument, but simply addressing intuition and objective morality and not addressing the ontological nature of morality.

It appears an absurdity to be philosophizing over a concept which includes the notion of an objective thing within the acknowledgement of subjective thing (morality). What do you think the philosophy/philosophers are attempting to achieve? Perhaps, that there is "something" outside of us which is the source of our ability to moralise (to acknowledge that morals exist/we have morals)?

Philosophers debate about many things and ultimately they want to discern what is the truth.

As POI wrote in the OP "Otseng stated the following: Objective morality is more an intuitive sense and it's not defined by a list of rules."

The statement itself seems contradictory. If it were written morality is a subjective thing to do with and internal (mindful) process (an intuitive sense) and is not defined by a list of rules" it would make sense.

Don't see how that makes sense since I'm discussing objective morality, not just morality.

Even so, it is understandable that POI makes the statement because it certainly does "seem" you are inferring such, given your (apparently unnecessary) inclusion of the word "objective" with the word "morality".

Again, what is being discussed is objective morality, not just morality. As I mentioned earlier:

I do not claim all morality is objective. What I do claim is morality consists of both subjective morality and objective morality.

I think we all agree subjective morality exists. So, the issue is if objective morality exists.

If you believe objective is unnecessary, then what is the difference between objective and subjective morality? Or is there no difference?

I've brought up several possible examples already.

And I have commented on those examples already. Does this mean we have reach an agreement?

We haven't even agreed on what is objective morality, so how can we reach agreement on what could be classified as objective morality?

Are you suggesting that eating bananas is a question of morality and equivalent to rape?

No, I'm suggesting strong feelings by itself does not determine objective morality.

I was not suggesting a strong feeling was all that was necessary.

Then we agree on this.

It is therefore not simply a case of having strong feelings about something to do with morality, which make those feelings "acceptable" but of having strong REASONING for why the feelings are relevant to morality and finer behaviour.

Yes, there are also reasons why rape is wrong. What is the reasoning why rape is wrong?

Therefore, even that a rapist might claim strong feelings about commiting rape, their then claiming it is acceptable would have to be accompanying with reasoning as to why such should be seen in that manner.

Rapists can give their own reasoning why they think it's acceptable, such as self-pleasure or domination.

In the meantime, there is a strong history of reasoning as to why rape is NOT acceptable, which has gained the prominent position, because no reasonable argument has ever been presented by rapists, which makes rape actually acceptable.
On that basis it can be claimed that what rapists do, is wrong.

So, rape is wrong under all circumstances?

How is your use of the word "objective" helpful in the context of morality when you also appear to be arguing that morality is not an objective thing?

Again, that's why we need to agree on the definitions. The definition I've proposed was morality that applies to all people at all times at all locations. You seem to be defining it as some object that exists outside of the human mind.

So tell me/us otseng - What is this "specific moral value" that has "universal agreement" that it is objective?

I've already presented a potential list of items, so not sure why you're asking me this again.

I made that clear in prior posts where I commented on your list of things.

Not really clear to me, but rather I see an ambiguous response. Here's what you stated:

We can see by those definitions offered, that the list of questions you asked...

"Is it wrong to rape someone?
Is it wrong to torture babies?
Is it OK to not bring any justice to those responsible for the Holocaust?
Is it acceptable to be unfaithful to your spouse?
Is it fine to steal from someone?
Is it wrong to murder someone?
Was it OK for the kid to cut in front of me yesterday in the grocery store checkout line?"

...in relation to the claim that objective morality exists, can garner different answers.

"Is it wrong to rape someone?"

If the answer is "yes" or "no", (with accompanying reasons) how does that provide us with evidence that a supposed absolute morality which (you claimed) "applies to all people at all times at all locations" actually exists?

The question is to a specific moral value ("Rape. is it right or wrong?") do you argue that there is universal agreement on the answer? Do you agree that the answer is objective or subjective? What makes a subjective thing an objective thing? What transpires as the process through which such is achieved?

There doesn't need to "universal agreement" either for something to be objectively true.

We can look at it from another perspective. If rape falls under subjective morality and one person believes rape is right and another believes rape is wrong, which one is correct?

[William]

[Replying to otseng in post #86]

Then why even use the word "objective" with the word "morality"?

Object and objective are two different things.

Some posts ago I C&Ped a short list of different definitions of objective and asked you which of these you were using.
You did not give an answer, and I am not going to try and read your mind for one.

Why not just define morality and leave out the word objective? Why bother to define something in that way, when it might not even exist? Of what use is the phrase "objective morality"?

Because this thread is about "objective morality", not just "morality".

It appears from the OP that the thread is about the claim of objective morality being a thing and that thing being under question.

I haven't seen in the thread yet, where "objective morality" has been concretely identified and so until this occurs, I wouldn't agree the thread is about "objective morality" but can agree it is about morality.

It appears an absurdity to be philosophizing over a concept which includes the notion of an objective thing within the acknowledgement of subjective thing (morality). What do you think the philosophy/philosophers are attempting to achieve? Perhaps, that there is "something" outside of us which is the source of our ability to moralise (to acknowledge that morals exist/we have morals)?

Philosophers debate about many things and ultimately they want to discern what is the truth.

If philosophers engage with the subject of objective morality, they would first have to define what it is they are talking about. Philosophizing about something which is undefined doesn't appear to be a philosophic thing one can do.

Don't see how that makes sense since I'm discussing objective morality, not just morality.

It doesn't make sense because you haven't defined it as being any different from just morality.

Again, what is being discussed is objective morality, not just morality. As I mentioned earlier:
otseng wrote: ↑Wed Mar 27, 2024 10:49 pm
"I do not claim all morality is objective. What I do claim is morality consists of both subjective morality and objective morality.

I think we all agree subjective morality exists. So, the issue is if objective morality exists."

If you believe objective is unnecessary, then what is the difference between objective and subjective morality? Or is there no difference?

If you believe an objective morality is necessary and is different from morality alone, do you have reasons for said belief?

We haven't even agreed on what is objective morality, so how can we reach agreement on what could be classified as objective morality?

Presently it appears unimportant to be agreeing on something niether of us are able define differently from morality alone.

I was not suggesting a strong feeling was all that was necessary.

Then we agree on this.

Do we also agree that weak feeling is also an ingredient of the process, but that no feeling/indifference is not (an ingredient to the process of the forming of moral awareness.)?

Yes, there are also reasons why rape is wrong. What is the reasoning why rape is wrong?

My current (and personal) understanding is based in defining "rape" in its "raw" state - as "anything which is put upon someone by someone else in which no consent (by the one being out upon) was given to do so."
I have no current reason as to why I should not think of rape in those terms or agree with others that it is wrong (in the human domain), due to the lack of consent (from the raped) involved with the process and the observed overall consequences of the act of the rapist upon the raped.

Therefore, even that a rapist might claim strong feelings about commiting rape, their then claiming it is acceptable would have to be accompanying with reasoning as to why such should be seen in that manner.

Rapists can give their own reasoning why they think it's acceptable, such as self-pleasure or domination.

Yes they can and they do. We can examine their reasons and decide whether these are reasonable.
In the case of the examples you gave above, I would not agree that their reasons are reasonable.

In the meantime, there is a strong history of reasoning as to why rape is NOT acceptable, which has gained the prominent position, because no reasonable argument has ever been presented by rapists, which makes rape actually acceptable.
On that basis it can be claimed that what rapists do, is wrong.

So, rape is wrong under all circumstances?

Currently that is my reasonable opinion, yes.

How is your use of the word "objective" helpful in the context of morality when you also appear to be arguing that morality is not an objective thing?

Again, that's why we need to agree on the definitions. The definition I've proposed was morality that applies to all people at all times at all locations. You seem to be defining it as some object that exists outside of the human mind.

Is your definition of morality different from you definition of objective morality?

There doesn't need to "universal agreement" either for something to be objectively true.

Then how do you reach the definition "morality that applies to all people at all times at all locations" if there also doesn't have to be "universal agreement"?

We can look at it from another perspective. If rape falls under subjective morality and one person believes rape is right and another believes rape is wrong, which one is correct?

My current position on the question of morality is that it is purely subjective and need not be referred to as "subjective morality" (since morality is obviously subjective) and remains so until someone can show their claim that "both" "subjective and objective morality" are different.

As to answering your question, those who think rape is wrong have a stronger (more reasonable) case than those who think rape is right.

Also to note, your question is directed to my subjective view, and is answered by the same subjective view.

We could ask if our subjective views are influenced by our study of objective happenings in our formulation of reasoning and conclusion, and answer "yes", but even that the objective happenings are helpful to the process, they are not the source of the process in that they are how we process information (reason). They are influences re subjective reasoning, not fundamental properties of subjective reasoning.

[SiNcE_1985]

Otseng stated the following: "Objective morality is more an intuitive sense and it's not defined by a list of rules."

For debate: Seems Otseng is stating that if one has strong intuition(s) about something or things, it is objectively moral?

1. I have strong intuition(s) that 2+2=16.

2. Therefore, 2+2=16.

Non sequitur.

Faulty logic.

[POI]

Otseng stated the following: "Objective morality is more an intuitive sense and it's not defined by a list of rules."

For debate: Seems Otseng is stating that if one has strong intuition(s) about something or things, it is objectively moral?

1. I have strong intuition(s) that 2+2=16.

2. Therefore, 2+2=16.

Non sequitur.

Faulty logic.

I would agree. However, some theists will argue that we 'just know' that murder is 'wrong'. Wouldn't this be an 'intuitive sense'?

[SiNcE_1985]

I would agree. However, some theists will argue that we 'just know' that murder is 'wrong'.

I don't think they argue this beyond the scope of God.

Wouldn't this be an 'intuitive sense'?

Not without God providing the intuition, no.