If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[Curious]

Curious,

I would ask that you re-consider THH's argument:

...an all-good God MUST choose not to create said universe. Period. Being all-powerful, he would have the power NOT to create the universe. Being all-good, he would be constrained from creating this universe, or any universe in which physical laws would lead to the suffering of sentient beings, GIVEN THAT HE HAD THE CHOICE NOT TO. The existence of the universe therefore disproves the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God.

It seems like he is not saying that "[a]n entity cannot be all-good because an entity that has unlimited power is not also shown to be of limited power." Where in his argument does he suggest that God is not all-good because he is not shown to have limited power? His thesis seems to be there are two incompatible statements about God, namely, being all-good and being all-powerful. I'm having trouble following your argument that he is defining all-powerful as a contradiction. He is simply going along with a popular definition of being all-powerful, that is, having the choice to create or not to create.

Ok please take note

...an all-good God MUST choose not to create said universe.

here he puts limitations on God but if the reference to God is a reference to an all-powerful God then the argument should read:

...an all-good God who cannot be restricted in His action MUST be restricted in His action.

The point is that while an all-good God might be compelled to a particular course of action, an all-good, all-powerful God cannot be subjected to such limitation. The argument is logically inconsistent.
The use of MUST negates the possibility of omnipotence as God would be unable to realise a possibility.

[harvey1]

...an all-good God MUST choose not to create said universe. here he puts limitations on God but if the reference to God is a reference to an all-powerful God then the argument should read:...an all-good God who cannot be restricted in His action MUST be restricted in His action. The point is that while an all-good God might be compelled to a particular course of action, an all-good, all-powerful God cannot be subjected to such limitation. The argument is logically inconsistent. The use of MUST negates the possibility of omnipotence as God would be unable to realise a possibility.

Hmm... I see your point. However, the "must" aspect of his argument doesn't necessarily mean that in order for God to be all-powerful, God must not be all-powerful. It could also mean (which I think THH qualified as saying such), that in order for God to be all-good God must do certain things and not do certain things, otherwise God is not all good. The "must" is stated so that it is understood that to be labelled "all-good," if it is to mean anything at all, means God would be prevented by the definition of "all-good" from making a world where people suffer (again, I'm talking as a fool). So, I still don't see how the use of all-powerful is contradictory. I agree with you, it is possible that THH could be in contradiction had he stated the "must" as a qualification on what all-powerful means, but he didn't do that. He used the "must" to qualify what he meant by "all-good," do you see the difference?

The reason I think this is important is because the whole atheist argument is confusing. So, I thought it might help to make sure it is not needlessly confusing. Are we all thoroughly confused yet?

[The Happy Humanist]

I would ask that you re-consider THH's argument:

How strange to find myself being defended by Harvey!

Curious, would it be easier for you if it were stated this way:

A) God is presented to us as all powerful.
B) God is presented to us as all-good.

C) If we can demonstrate that unnecessary evil exists, then we will be justified in disbelieving either or both propositions above - and therefore justified in disbelieving God as he is presented.

D) The creation of the universe (1) was unnecessary, (2) led to foreseeable bad things happening, and (3) was an inferior choice, given that God could have created humankind in heaven, fully glorified and pure and ready to shout those Hosannahs without millenia of tribulations.

E) Either God was powerless to stop the creation of the universe (negating A), or
F) God is not all-good (negating B), or
G) Both

Therefore,
H) God as described does not exist.

This, I think, sidesteps the (non)issue being raised by Curious, while maintaining the integrity of my thesis.

But I praise Harvey for his intellectual integrity (and I'll deal with his arguments later!)

[The Happy Humanist]

You said it. Would an omnipotent God be able to simulate experiences so convincingly that the simulated inhabitants of the simulated universe believe that it was actually real? Most definitely.

At which point it ceases to be a simulation. If we believe our suffering to be real, then it is real. You can die in the Matrix, remember? So you're back to square one.

Am I to believe that you are stating here that the tsunami actually proves the existence of God. That's a strange conclusion

Yes, it would be, were it not the exact opposite of my thesis. When I speak of God doing things, or being responsible for things, I am of course speaking within the milieu of your mythology. I do not hold God responsible for such things. I attribute them purely to the nature of existence.

[Curious]

The "must" is stated so that it is understood that to be labelled "all-good," if it is to mean anything at all, means God would be prevented by the definition of "all-good" from making a world where people suffer (again, I'm talking as a fool). So, I still don't see how the use of all-powerful is contradictory. I agree with you, it is possible that THH could be in contradiction had he stated the "must" as a qualification on what all-powerful means, but he didn't do that. He used the "must" to qualify what he meant by "all-good," do you see the difference?

But the application of MUST is not restricted to the definition of good but to the action of God (who in this case we refer to as being omnipotent). While the term MUST might have been used to qualify "good" , good here is an attribute and not an action. That God MUST do certain things and MUST NOT do other things contradicts the definition of omnipotence. If we were to use such an argument then it would be just as consistent to arrive at the following answer:

...an all-good God who cannot be restricted in His action MUST be restricted in His action = God is false MUST ALSO BE God is true

[harvey1]

How strange to find myself being defended by Harvey!

I'm trying a new tactic on Spetey. From my perspective it seems he disagrees with everything I say, so if he disagrees with me here, then we'll be getting somewhere. 8)

But the application of MUST is not restricted to the definition of good but to the action of God (who in this case we refer to as being omnipotent). While the term MUST might have been used to qualify "good" , good here is an attribute and not an action. That God MUST do certain things and MUST NOT do other things contradicts the definition of omnipotence. If we were to use such an argument then it would be just as consistent to arrive at the following answer: ...an all-good God who cannot be restricted in His action MUST be restricted in His action = God is false MUST ALSO BE God is true

Okay, let's break this down...

But the application of MUST is not restricted to the definition of good but to the action of God (who in this case we refer to as being omnipotent).

1. ...an all-good God MUST choose not to create said universe....
2. Being all-powerful, he would have the power NOT to create the universe.
3. Being all-good, he would be constrained from creating this universe, or any universe in which physical laws would lead to the suffering of sentient beings, GIVEN THAT HE HAD THE CHOICE NOT TO.

Notice that in (1) THH restricts the application of "must" to God's choice as it relates to (3) and not (2). All that (2) does is clarify God's omnipotence by stating that there is a choice (again, I'm talking as a fool). (3) provides the reason on why God "must" not create the universe in (1). Notice, (3) states the reason in terms of a definition of all-good ("being all-good... he would [not create a universe that] would lead to the suffering of sentient beings..."). Yes, it refers to a restriction on God's action, but the restriction is instituted by being all-good (i.e., "being all-good... he would be..."). That's an implication of being all-good, not an implication of being all-powerful.

While the term MUST might have been used to qualify "good" , good here is an attribute and not an action. That God MUST do certain things and MUST NOT do other things contradicts the definition of omnipotence.

not create the universe and thereby avoid all the nastiness... an all-good God MUST choose not to create said universe.... Being all-good... he would be constrained from creating this universe

I agree, he uses "good" as an attribute, so what? The "must" qualifies what that attribute means in terms of God's potential actions. If I said you are a good person, and therefore you would not lie, have I somehow said something about how powerful you are as a person? No. It just means that there's certain actions you absolutely wouldn't do because you are that kind of person. Similarly, THH is saying that there are certain actions that restrict God according to what a good action is.

That God MUST do certain things and MUST NOT do other things contradicts the definition of omnipotence.

That's THH's argument. He wants to show that either God is not all-good or not all-powerful. However, he does this by trying to force a contradiction. Had he tried to present a consistent portrayal of all-powerful that was consistent with an all-good God, then in his mind he would not be able to do this since his point is that these two terms are in conflict.

If we were to use such an argument then it would be just as consistent to arrive at the following answer: ...an all-good God who cannot be restricted in His action MUST be restricted in His action = God is false MUST ALSO BE God is true

I don't see that at all. He shifts the burden on believers to show that he is equivocating on the terms all-powerful or all-good, but that in itself does not mean that he has set up an argument that is illogical. He merely has grabbed terms out of the air that atheists think a theist means by those terms. I agree that the terms need to be clarified, but I don't agree that one cannot show two statements in conflict in order to show a contradiction in one's beliefs.

[The Happy Humanist]

I'm trying a new tactic on Spetey. From my perspective it seems he disagrees with everything I say, so if he disagrees with me here, then we'll be getting somewhere. 8)

I think you just like a good argument. 8)

[harvey1]

I think you just like a good argument.

Only God is good.

[Curious]

Curious, would it be easier for you if it were stated this way:

A) God is presented to us as all powerful.
B) God is presented to us as all-good.

C) If we can demonstrate that unnecessary evil exists, then we will be justified in disbelieving either or both propositions above - and therefore justified in disbelieving God as he is presented.

D) The creation of the universe (1) was unnecessary, (2) led to foreseeable bad things happening, and (3) was an inferior choice, given that God could have created humankind in heaven, fully glorified and pure and ready to shout those Hosannahs without millenia of tribulations.

E) Either God was powerless to stop the creation of the universe (negating A), or
F) God is not all-good (negating B), or
G) Both

Therefore,
H) God as described does not exist.

This, I think, sidesteps the (non)issue being raised by Curious, while maintaining the integrity of my thesis.

But I praise Harvey for his intellectual integrity (and I'll deal with his arguments later!)

I will refer you back to my original response to your thesis. I only bring this up as you make reference to it's integrity.

The final outcome of worldly existence will be that bad things happened unnecessarily, i.e. sentient beings suffered enormously, and a purported creator-God will have been responsible for all of it/them. No amount of "net good" can overcome this.

My thesis again, in a nutshell: God is all-powerful. God is all-good. Given the following solution set:

- create the universe and all that must (by your own thesis) go with it, good, bad and ugly,
- not create the universe and thereby avoid all the nastiness,

...an all-good God MUST choose not to create said universe. Period. Being all-powerful, he would have the power NOT to create the universe. Being all-good, he would be constrained from creating this universe, or any universe in which physical laws would lead to the suffering of sentient beings, GIVEN THAT HE HAD THE CHOICE NOT TO.

The existence of the universe therefore disproves the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God.

Any questions?

Good to see you all again.

I have a question for you. I would be interested in knowing how you conclude that an all powerful God could be COMPELLED NOT TO DO SOMETHING. While your argument might have some merit in excluding the existence of an all-good limited God, your argument is fallacious in respect to a God that is all powerful. To suggest that an all-powerful God would be compelled to either action or inaction is a dichotomy.

You state:
"The existence of the universe therefore disproves the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God."
This is not the case at all though is it. Your basic premise that an all-good, all-powerful God must also have personally created the universe and is ultimately be responsible for the world's ills is a little hard to swallow.
It could just as easily be argued that if Koran is made up it proves that the Torah is made up or that if we prove that Ra does not exist, then this proves Kali does not.
I have no argument concerning the inconsistency of the biblical presentation but you clearly state that:

"The existence of the universe therefore disproves the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God."

Which does not exclude the possibility of a different all-good, all-powerful God. Even the existence of such a God as creator(which is not necessarily a precondition for all-goodess and omnipotence) might allow certain leeway as a means of creating greater order. Even in the Old Testament, after the creation of the heavens and the earth, God is said to have seen that it was good. Now this is a reference to good that pre-dates either life or death, suffering or enjoyment. Good can mean many different things to many different people but in this context probably refers to it being pleasing, ordered or well created. It might be suggested that God need not have been alone and of the "spirits", many saw the creation and were amazed. What if these spirits pleaded with God to be allowed to experience this wonderful creation first hand but God warned them against this as such existence would bring about hardship and suffering, ignorance and eventual physical death. These spirits might have pleaded that such suffering was a price that was worth paying for such an adventure and without such things the adventure would seem incomplete. And so God allowed them access to His "playground", but because of His overwheming goodness made His presence known to those earnestly seeking him.
Now I am quite aware of the apparent absurdity of such an argument but it does illustrate how the presence of evil or suffering does not exclude the existence of such a proposition where this God is all-good and all-powerful but stays His hand out of respect for the wishes of His spiritual children.

[Curious]

I don't see that at all. He shifts the burden on believers to show that he is equivocating on the terms all-powerful or all-good, but that in itself does not mean that he has set up an argument that is illogical. He merely has grabbed terms out of the air that atheists think a theist means by those terms. I agree that the terms need to be clarified, but I don't agree that one cannot show two statements in conflict in order to show a contradiction in one's beliefs.

I really can't see how I can put this any more simply than I have done.
The argument put forward by THH is that God cannot be all-good if God is not something that God is not. The argument does not show anything paradoxical concerning God, it is paradoxical iself. There must be someone who attends this forum who understands the necessity for an argument to be logically consistent. After all it is hardly brain surgery that we are discussing here.