The Permissibility of Faith

[spetey]

Hi folks!

In my experience, when debating with those who believe in God, my interlocutors will inevitably appeal to faith as their justification for belief. (Some don't call it "faith"--some call it "intuition", or "trust" or some such.) I'm very wary of such appeals, because I hear it as "I will continue to believe despite lack of evidence or argument for my position (at least, of the kind that I can share with anyone who disagrees)." I think such behavior is impermissible. Faith to me is just dogmatism, and to me, dogmatism of any kind is very dangerous.

For comparison: imagine, for example, that you met a rabid racist. You give a carefully reasoned argument to the effect that skin color doesn't matter to who a person is or what rights they have, etc. The racist responds: "Although I have no answer to your argument, or arguments that I can share with you for my own position, I just believe; I have faith that my race is superior." You would be at an impasse, right? Should you come to disagree over some important social policy measure, there is no way to reason out your disagreement. Instead you have to see who has more money for PR, or who has more tanks, or what have you. I assume that in these cases we all agree that "faith" is in an important sense impermissible. We think the racist is being dogmatic, and we think that it's destructive not to be open to reasoning.

So why might appeal to faith be permissible when it comes to discussions of religion? Or have I somehow misconstrued what it is to appeal to faith?


spetey

[harvey1]

Okay, let me see if I can get it right this time...

5) Beliefs can be terminal in regards to an external justification but it is not essential [a]. If external, beliefs are "without themselves being justified... or... some [external beliefs] are self-justif[ied]" . Your "core beliefs" are never terminal in regards to an internal justification [c]. Aside from that, "core beliefs" must always be, ideally, internally justified "as a result of 'support[ing] each other mutually.' [d]"

[a] The core beliefs may or may not be externally justified;
"my core beliefs could be externally justified by something foundational. (As you quote me saying, I am a foundationalist on external justification.)"
[c] "I don't think there are any [internal] 'terminal' beliefs"
[d] "my best guesses are foundherentism (i.e., 'coherentism with the proviso that some mental states are more important to maintain than others') when it comes to internal justification"

Is that better? I want to get as accurate as possible so that I could teach a class on Speteyism...

Can you give us some hint about how my views on the structure of justification are relevant to the main issue? To remind you, that main issue is: When you cannot give others reason for your position, and others can give reason against your position, is it permissible to continue to believe that position to the same degree--even when that belief has an impact on many others' lives?

I don't know about others, but I can give you a hint. As I said, without a pragmatic justification as a basis for all justification, I doubt anyone can justify anything. Since I see that you feel uneasy with the route that I use to justify my reasons, I think it's necessary to see how it is that you think beliefs are justified (exactly so). I still hold to the position that you cannot meet the terms of this thread, and that ultimately it might be you who cannot give reasons for your "core beliefs" - whereas I am giving such reasons because of my externalist (pragmatic) justification.

[spetey]

Is that better? I want to get as accurate as possible so that I could teach a class on Speteyism...

I appreciate your interest in my views. But I really doubt the finer points of my view on epistemic justification are in any way relevant.

As for this attempt (below), I'm sorry, but it's not better--it's much worse. Your previous (5) was correct, except for the assumption that the "core beliefs" can't be externally justified. But in this new (5), some of the phrases do not even make sense.

5) Beliefs can be terminal in regards to an external justification but it is not essential

As I understand your term "terminal beliefs", they are foundational beliefs. I don't think any beliefs are foundational. Any one is subject to revision. Beliefs may have external justification, and I think external justification is foundationalist in nature (that is, something non-justified, such as a "reliable" belief-forming process, can confer justification on beliefs).

If external, beliefs are "without themselves being justified... or... some [external beliefs] are self-justif[ied]".

This has serious grammatical problems--I can't parse it at all.

Your "core beliefs" are never terminal in regards to an internal justification.

The way I understand your terms "terminal beliefs" and "core beliefs", this is correct.

Aside from that, "core beliefs" must always be, ideally, internally justified "as a result of 'support[ing] each other mutually.'

Close--it's not that there are certain "core beliefs" that must always be justified. Rather beliefs more crucial to the coherence of the whole are thereby the "core beliefs".

I still hold to the position that you cannot meet the terms of this thread, and that ultimately it might be you who cannot give reasons for your "core beliefs" - whereas I am giving such reasons because of my externalist (pragmatic) justification.

Why do we need details of my epistemology to discuss this? First of all, if you think it's important to try to give reasons for your view, then excellent, we agree on the core topic of this thread! That's all I need to hear! So let's cede the floor to those who think they don't need reasons for their beliefs, and we can hound those people together!

Second of all, if you can give me reasons to believe in God (via externalist pragmatic justification or via whatever route you like), that's awesome, let's hear them on that thread where the action is for giving reasons!

If your goal here is to use my epistemology to show that I am somehow committed to dogmatism, I think you'll have a very hard time. A large cause of my opposition to dogmatism is the thought I've put into epistemology. (Remember: it's a coherentism where no belief is foundational or unrevisable.) And I'm not sure where your confidence comes from that my view is flawed in some way, except that you think I draw the wrong conclusion about God. So far I do not have confidence that you understand my position so well that you'll soon be able to convince me you understand its implications far better than I do.


spetey

[harvey1]

I appreciate your interest in my views. But I really doubt the finer points of my view on epistemic justification are in any way relevant... If your goal here is to use my epistemology to show that I am somehow committed to dogmatism, I think you'll have a very hard time. A large cause of my opposition to dogmatism is the thought I've put into epistemology. (Remember: it's a coherentism where no belief is foundational or unrevisable.) And I'm not sure where your confidence comes from that my view is flawed in some way, except that you think I draw the wrong conclusion about God. So far I do not have confidence that you understand my position so well that you'll soon be able to convince me you understand its implications far better than I do.

The way I see it, I live in a stone house, and there are some religionists who live in glass houses. However, Spetey comes along (who lives in a glass house) saying (as I sit on the porch of my stone house watching this...), "hey, why don't you throw rocks at those glass houses with me, and then we can see why my glass house is better constructed and can withstand storms better than your stone house." First, you shouldn't be throwing stones at other glass houses if you live in a glass house, and you shouldn't be telling people in stone houses that your glass house can withstand storms better than the fella in a stone house. Now, we already talked about why throwing stones at my stone house is a little ridiculous, and now you want to talk about the "poor" construction of my house. However, as I look at your house I don't think you are in position to say or do any of these things.

As for this attempt (below), I'm sorry, but it's not better--it's much worse. Your previous (5) was correct, except for the assumption that the "core beliefs" can't be externally justified. But in this new (5), some of the phrases do not even make sense.

Okay, let's fix it then. But, first...

I don't think any beliefs are foundational... . Beliefs may have external justification, and I think external justification is foundationalist in nature (that is, something non-justified, such as a "reliable" belief-forming process, can confer justification on beliefs).

This quote has me confused. Beliefs aren't foundational (i.e., "the view that some things.. provide justification without themselves being justified (or that some things are self-justifying..."), however "beliefs may have external justification" which is "foundationalist in nature"? Doesn't that contradict itself in a few ways?

• (*)you seem to contradict yourself by saying "aren't foundational" and "what is foundationalist in nature" How can beliefs both be non-foundational but at the same time have a property which is foundationalist in nature?
  
  (*)the term externally justified means to me an inference to something outside of us that is true or something in the world that should be assumed as true. However, you seem to be saying that beliefs don't make that appeal since you said foundationalism "...provide[s] justification without themselves being justified...". How can beliefs be externally justified and not be foundationalist?

The purpose here is just to gain clarity...

[spetey]

The way I see it, I live in a stone house, and there are some religionists who live in glass houses. However, Spetey comes along (who lives in a glass house) saying (as I sit on the porch of my stone house watching this...), "hey, why don't you throw rocks at those glass houses with me, and then we can see why my glass house is better constructed and can withstand storms better than your stone house." First, you shouldn't be throwing stones at other glass houses if you live in a glass house, and you shouldn't be telling people in stone houses that your glass house can withstand storms better than the fella in a stone house. Now, we already talked about why throwing stones at my stone house is a little ridiculous, and now you want to talk about the "poor" construction of my house. However, as I look at your house I don't think you are in position to say or do any of these things.

Good. Now do away with the metaphor and let's get down to it. We both think the other's belief system is not coherent. I have given you reason to think yours is not coherent, and I have given you reasons demonstrating the coherence of mine. So far you have just claimed that my house is glass and yours stone. Please demonstrate this through reasoning on another thread, or else defend the policy of believing such a controversial thing without reasons here.

I don't think any beliefs are foundational... . Beliefs may have external justification, and I think external justification is foundationalist in nature (that is, something non-justified, such as a "reliable" belief-forming process, can confer justification on beliefs).

This quote has me confused. Beliefs aren't foundational (i.e., "the view that some things.. provide justification without themselves being justified (or that some things are self-justifying..."), however "beliefs may have external justification" which is "foundationalist in nature"? Doesn't that contradict itself in a few ways?

<sigh> No. As I stated very clearly in my definition of foundationalism, justification can come from a non-justified thing, not just a belief. For example, on a very naive external foundationalism, my belief that a desk is in front of me could be justified by the desk itself. The desk is not epistemically justified; it's just a desk. Nonetheless on such a view it confers justification on my belief that a desk is there. Just to remind you, here is that definition again:

foundationalism: the view that some things (not necessarily beliefs) provide justification without themselves being justified (or that some things are self-justifying, but that would alter the definitions below slightly).

(*)the term externally justified means to me an inference to something outside of us that is true or something in the world that should be assumed as true.

That is not what external justification is; I guess that would be a posteriori justification or something.

I'm sorry but I don't want to give a lecture on internalism and externalism in epistemology until you've given me reason to think it's even vaguely relevant. What I think would be way more productive on this thread would be for you (or anyone) to try to say why it's okay to keep believing something controversial when you can give no reasons for it (that is, why it's okay to appeal to faith on such issues).


spetey

[harvey1]

Again, I find you an extremely decent educator, so I appreciate all of your patience in this topic... 8)

I'm sorry but I don't want to give a lecture on internalism and externalism in epistemology until you've given me reason to think it's even vaguely relevant. What I think would be way more productive on this thread would be for you (or anyone) to try to say why it's okay to keep believing something controversial when you can give no reasons for it (that is, why it's okay to appeal to faith on such issues).

Here again is your opening statement:

my interlocutors will inevitably appeal to faith as their justification for belief. (Some don't call it "faith"--some call it "intuition", or "trust" or some such.)... So why might appeal to faith be permissible when it comes to discussions of religion? [my emphasis]

However, compare that quote to this quote by you:

"I don't think any beliefs are foundational" and in another place, "my belief that a desk is in front of me could be justified by the desk itself."[my emphasis]

It seems to me that you are making an appeal to faith since you have not provided any conditions on how an inanimate object can confer belief (e.g., "it confers justification on my belief that a desk is there" [my emphasis]). This is the same as "intuition" or "trust" and, according to your terminology, it is an appeal to faith. Notice that I have provided such conditions by framing those conditions within a pragmatic framework. You said you were an epistemic pragmatist, but nowhere have you referred to a pragmatic framework, so it strikes me initially that you are appealing to faith.

It's unfair to you for me to judge your statements like this, and I didn't want to get into this argument until clearly understanding your beliefs in a statement, but you are extremely reluctant to engage in a discussion of your own beliefs. However you demand others reconcile their beliefs with your definition of faith without doing so yourself. In fact, you refuse to do so by saying it is not relevant to this thread! What gives? Haven't you heard of a two-way street?

[spetey]

Again, I find you an extremely decent educator, so I appreciate all of your patience in this topic... 8)

Thanks. I appreciate your trying to connect it back to the point of the thread.

"I don't think any beliefs are foundational" and in another place, "my belief that a desk is in front of me could be justified by the desk itself."[my emphasis]

It seems to me that you are making an appeal to faith since you have not provided any conditions on how an inanimate object can confer belief (e.g., "it confers justification on my belief that a desk is there" [my emphasis]). This is the same as "intuition" or "trust" and, according to your terminology, it is an appeal to faith.

Several things here:

• The example I gave is an example of, as I said, a very naive theory of external justification. But even in that case, it's not that there is an appeal to faith involved. The fact that there is in fact a desk there, causing my perceptions of a desk, does seem to do with whether a belief that there is a desk there is justified, doesn't it? It seems like we have good reason to say the belief is a good one.
• Of course this reason is not available to the thinker herself--whether her perceptions of a desk are actually caused by a desk (rather than, say, a Matrix hallucination). Thus she cannot herself appeal to this justification for her belief. That's, roughly, why such justification is external (to the thinker).
• Meanwhile it's perfectly consistent that the thinker have her own internal justification of her belief, to do with its coherence with her other beliefs. Thus she need not appeal to faith in her claim that a desk is before her. She can give reasons for her belief. (Like that she has perceptions of a desk, her belief that there's a desk there jibes with a lot of other beliefs like that she's in her study, in the past such a belief based on such perceptions has turned out apparently useful to her goals, etc.)

You said you were an epistemic pragmatist, but nowhere have you referred to a pragmatic framework, so it strikes me initially that you are appealing to faith.

Oh so it's pragmatism or faith? Yes, when it comes to internal justification I'm a pragmatist. This is something of an unusual line, but I assure you it is not inconsistent with any of what has gone before. In too brief, I just think that (apparent) desire-satisfaction is a large part of what contributes to belief (and desire) coherence. This makes me pragmatist.

It's unfair to you for me to judge your statements like this, and I didn't want to get into this argument until clearly understanding your beliefs in a statement, but you are extremely reluctant to engage in a discussion of your own beliefs. However you demand others reconcile their beliefs with your definition of faith without doing so yourself. In fact, you refuse to do so by saying it is not relevant to this thread! What gives? Haven't you heard of a two-way street?

I'm happy to give reasons for my view, and I have done so all along. I'm only reluctant because they don't seem to have anything to do with the claim you want to establish: that it's okay to keep believing something controversial without reasons. Please try to establish that, or else agree that it's not okay.


spetey

[harvey1]

[*] The example I gave is an example of, as I said, a very naive theory of external justification. But even in that case, it's not that there is an appeal to faith involved. The fact that there is in fact a desk there, causing my perceptions of a desk, does seem to do with whether a belief that there is a desk there is justified, doesn't it? It seems like we have good reason to say the belief is a good one.

Yes, if life were that simple who could argue? Unfortunately, a great many things we believe are not as simple as naive externalism. For example, we should be very welcoming of expert testimony that we know is easily collaborated by other experts in the same field. Otherwise, we couldn't have a reliable education system. You need external reasons to believe this to be true (e.g., you can see the little do-dads inside the microscope yourself...), however you can't possibly verify most claims made by experts all by yourself. Perhaps less than a fraction of a fraction of all believed-to-be-true claims by experts have any kind of naive externalist foundation which most of us non-experts could verify. Even if we could examine the findings of every microscope, telescope, spectrometer, etc, we would still need to rely on the reliability of those instruments as made and callibrated properly. Therefore, you have to provide conditions by which to know when "belief that a [expert's testimony]... could be justified by the [expert testimony] itself." Coherentism by itself is not sufficient since an expert could easily lie by providing testimony that perfectly coheres with your other beliefs.

I use pragmatic experience by which to make this justification. I believe that I am warranted in trusting those sources while still being a little fallibilistic in that trust. In fact, on closer analysis, it seems to me that all justification amounts to this kind of foundation since even the human mind evolved over a great deal of time to incorporate these features into any internal justification that might exist (e.g., coherentism).

I see this completely missing in your account and it makes me believe that you believe experts because they cohere with your other beliefs. That seems unfounded to me since how do you know those other beliefs are right? Well, you found those on some "core beliefs" which " may or may not be externally justified." To me, that's like saying that you may or may not have invented what you believe to be true with the only insurance that you try to make those invented beliefs cohere with what might be externally justified. For example, perhaps you've invented the belief that the universe is all material and you only accept it because it coheres with your other invented beliefs dealing with atheism. What is actually derived from external things?? I think every belief should eventually be derived from something external via a pragmatic maxim, otherwise you miles well espouse any belief you like just as long as it stays consistent with your materialist (i.e., religious) beliefs. It would seem you would be happy with this as long as your beliefs cohere since you have given me no reason to think you hold your beliefs accountable to any external conditions in the world. And, if you are, you have not provided a reasonable framework to show how they are always and without exception accountable to the 'world of experience.' You've only given very vague lip-service to how "core beliefs" must have some kind of causal reference to something in the world.

[*]Of course this reason is not available to the thinker herself--whether her perceptions of a desk are actually caused by a desk (rather than, say, a Matrix hallucination). Thus she cannot herself appeal to this justification for her belief. That's, roughly, why such justification is external (to the thinker).

The desk is external, but reasons for her believing there is a desk cannot ultimately be reliant on the fact that such a belief coheres with her environment. There are far too many beliefs which would cohere just fine with our environment since we never personally run into the trouble that comes from having a false belief. For example, I've run into atheists that reject that virtual particles can pop in and pop out of existence. That's because they prefer a belief that coheres with dialectical materialism and their denial of vp's actually cohere better with their other beliefs than does admitting to their existence. If they saw the Casimir effect experiments and had to write a paper on what is causing that effect, then they might have coherence problems to address. But, for the most part, they live life just fine thinking that their beliefs cohere. They are forming beliefs which are founded on what you call "faith." Okay, using that terminology, I see why you think that approach is dangerous because if bunches of people believe as the dialectical materialist, then maybe some promising research in quantum cosmology doesn't get funded, etc. Fortunately, we live in a pragmatic-based society that doesn't try and test a belief based on pure coherence, but rather, a lot is left to the pragmatic experience that comes from funding smart physicists who play off their hunches, etc.

In your concept of justification, it seems as though it actually encourages dogmatism. Which is why, I would speculate, that atheists tend to be the most dogmatic of people. That's off the subject, but it is one of my beliefs based on long experience in debating people.

[*] Meanwhile it's perfectly consistent that the thinker have her own internal justification of her belief, to do with its coherence with her other beliefs. Thus she need not appeal to faith in her claim that a desk is before her. She can give reasons for her belief. (Like that she has perceptions of a desk, her belief that there's a desk there jibes with a lot of other beliefs like that she's in her study, in the past such a belief based on such perceptions has turned out apparently useful to her goals, etc.)

This, I think, sums up your error in thought. You are not acknowledging the primacy of pragmatism over coherentism. This is the essence of a "faith-based" approach. Yes, beliefs must cohere, I fully agree. However, coherence is ultimately secondary to a much more global and durable pragmatic framework. Beliefs must be selected primarily on their pragmatic use to the "society" which is providing the overall organizing structure of accepted knowledge. In the case of science, all the beliefs must first be instrumentally secure (i.e., they must have passed experimental muster), and then they should cohere. A perfect example of this is the conflict between relativity theories and quantum mechanics. If coherence of beliefs is primary, as you suggest, then science is forced to decide on a belief and junk the other. If they cannot decide, then they are forced not to teach the beliefs of each where they are in conflict. That is unacceptable!

Oh so it's pragmatism or faith?

No, it's pragmatism or show me how beliefs are causally connected to the world. I'm not interested in a good story that someone puts together that coheres if they never look out the window or open the door. I'm interested in how beliefs connect with the world and how you can have reason for a belief which is actually based on the world and not our own clever abilities to invent whatever suits our fancy (e.g., dialectical materialism). If you are going to rely on some set of core beliefs that "may or may not" connect causally to the outside world, or if they do connect you just consider them self-justified, then I think you are talking a language of "faith" which you yourself condemned.

Yes, when it comes to internal justification I'm a pragmatist. This is something of an unusual line, but I assure you it is not inconsistent with any of what has gone before. In too brief, I just think that (apparent) desire-satisfaction is a large part of what contributes to belief (and desire) coherence. This makes me pragmatist.

Lovejoy is rolling over about right now... It seems you are talking about a theory of meaning. Is that right? In other words, a pragmatic internalist will see meaning in the use of cohered statements... Wouldn't a more appropriate name be semantic pragmatism? I would agree to this too, but the caveat being that coherence is never primary with regard to pragmatic externalism. Our "core beliefs" are ultimately based on those that best make use of the environment (extending back from evolutionary history), and by and large we developed (i.e., evolved) a shortcut to this process by using some internal standards by which we can quickly locate the most pragmatic solution that would work in the environment.

I'm happy to give reasons for my view, and I have done so all along. I'm only reluctant because they don't seem to have anything to do with the claim you want to establish: that it's okay to keep believing something controversial without reasons. Please try to establish that, or else agree that it's not okay.

I have my pragmatic externalist-driven reasons for rejecting beliefs without a reason, but your "may or may not" sounds a lot like what you call "faith."

[spetey]

Ugh, I'm sorry Harvey, but this is so horribly confused. Let me try to extract some nuggets of meaning...

In your concept of justification, it seems as though it actually encourages dogmatism.

I know, you've suggested as much. Can you tell me why you think that? So far you've in effect just said things like "I don't think your epistemology is good" and "your epistemology leads to dogmatism" (and then a lot of stuff of which I can make no sense, I think because you are not yet comfortable with the distinctions and terms involved). Can you show me how my own theory manages to imply the negation of what I think it implies? I know you believe this. I know it "seems as though" my theory is bad to you. And I'm open to the idea my theory is bad. It's certainly happened in the past. But for me to believe my theory is bad, I need a reason. Please give it to me or drop it!

This, I think, sums up your error in thought. You are not acknowledging the primacy of pragmatism over coherentism.

Okay, here at least you are trying to point out what's wrong with my theory. and I appreciate it. It involves a basic confusion, though: pragmatism and coherentism are simply not in competition. One is a theory about the structure of the justification relation, and one about the constitutive nature of justification.

It seems you are talking about a theory of meaning. Is that right? In other words, a pragmatic internalist will see meaning in the use of cohered statements...

No, not at all. It's not a theory of meaning. It's an epistemology. I'm not trying to establish how to determine the content of mental states or sentences, as a theory of meaning would. This is another basic confusion.

These last two are just some of your more glaring mistakes. I do not want to sift through all your recent claims with a fine-toothed comb, pointing out each and every flaw and confusion; it would take hours to untangle that stuff. For now I ask you to trust me, given my past explanations of confusions you make, that there are several more confusions in what you say in this last post. Epistemology does not look like an area where you are soon going to be demonstrating such remarkable expertise and understanding that you are going to talk me out of my position.

Lucky for you, we don't have to discuss epistemology--any more than doctors trying to diagnose symptoms have to, or detectives trying to solve a murder have to. This is a much simpler issue than that and doesn't require such meta-talk. You say you can "reject beliefs without a reason", and you have "pragmatic externalist-driven reasons" to justify this position. And you say I appeal to faith myself:

I have my pragmatic externalist-driven reasons for rejecting beliefs without a reason, but your "may or may not" sounds a lot like what you call "faith."

Okay. Show me. Give me the reasons you have for the permissibility of rejecting beliefs without a reason. Can the dogmatic racist have the same justification? And where are the faith appeals in my account, where no one belief is held to be unrevisable?


spetey

[harvey1]

Spetey, don't take this the wrong way, but why are you here? Is it to say "I do not want to sift through all your recent claims.. I ask you to trust me... you are [not] going to talk me out of my position.... Lucky for you, we don't have to discuss epistemology"?

If so, then I'm not interested in that kind of discussion. This topic as well as the other on diversity of belief is about epistemology and you brought up epistemology by "throwing stones" when you yourself have a "glass house." I brought up a series of points and you hardly even addressed any of those points. If my knowledge of epistemology is too crude, then it should take you seconds to show contradictions, but so far, my "crude" understanding of epistemology has shown contradictions in only your position.

In your concept of justification, it seems as though it actually encourages dogmatism.

I know, you've suggested as much. Can you tell me why you think that?

Simply put, you have made no statement to the effect that your beliefs are as a result of how reality appears to us. The most you have committed to is that core beliefs "may or may not be externally justified." That's not sufficient. What if a theist said that their beliefs on God, "may or may not have anything to do with the way the world appears"? If you pressed them on what they are committed to they just said, "I am committed to all my theist beliefs about God being consistent with my Church's beliefs about God". You'd hardly be happy with such a statement and you'd be crying dogmatism. However, this is exactly what your "may or may not" sounds like to me. It looks like you are encouraging dogmatism. But, your dogmatism is of the materialist kind.

But for me to believe my theory is bad, I need a reason. Please give it to me or drop it!

Well, gee, Spetey, do you think you still "want to sift through all [my] recent claims"? It seems you don't want reasons you want compliance.

This, I think, sums up your error in thought. You are not acknowledging the primacy of pragmatism over coherentism.

Okay, here at least you are trying to point out what's wrong with my theory. and I appreciate it. It involves a basic confusion, though: pragmatism and coherentism are simply not in competition. One is a theory about the structure of the justification relation, and one about the constitutive nature of justification.

Let me quote BonJour:

Coherence is purely a matter of the internal relations between the components of the belief system; it depends in no way on any sort of relation between the system of beliefs and anything external to that system. Hence if, as a coherence theory claims, coherence is the sole basis for empirical justification, it follows that a system of empirical beliefs might be adequately justified, indeed might constitute empirical knowledge, in spite of being utterly out of contact with the world that it purports to describe. Nothing about any requirement of coherence dictates that a coherent system of beliefs need receive any sort of input from the world or be in any way causally influenced by the world (Laurence BonJour, "The Structure of Empirical Justification", 1985, p. 108).[my emphasis]

Many pragmatists, on the other hand, would never put primary emphasis on coherence. That's not to say coherence is not important, though. However, since you have this view that core beliefs "may or may not be externally justified" you are subject to the very criticism that BonJour is making in the italics above. I addressed the same point as BonJour, and you didn't even respond to this criticism. You just said "trust me"!

Epistemology does not look like an area where you are soon going to be demonstrating such remarkable expertise and understanding that you are going to talk me out of my position.

That's fine. We can restrict our dialogue on just the topic about whether atheism is reasonable or not. I see no need to discuss topics (in this thread or the one on diversity of beliefs) that we cannot freely discuss on both sides. It makes no sense for me to reply if I fundamentally disagree with you but I am not allowed to talk about it.

Okay. Show me. Give me the reasons you have for the permissibility of rejecting beliefs without a reason. Can the dogmatic racist have the same justification? And where are the faith appeals in my account, where no one belief is held to be unrevisable?

I already showed that I'm not rejecting or accepting beliefs without a reason. However, you failed to demonstrate that you are basing your beliefs on the world versus a different goal of just attempting to keep your beliefs consistent with what you already believe to be true, namely materialism and atheism. That's hardly a reason to trust you that you are developing non-dogmatic views of the world (see the BonJour quote above).

So, it's okay if we concentrate on just one topic. I don't mind it at all since I'm spending way too much time in this site, but I thought it would be helpful for me to see how a knowledgeable atheist justifies their knowledge of materialism and atheist metaphysics. Unfortunately I couldn't find that to be the case.

[spetey]

Spetey, don't take this the wrong way, but why are you here? Is it to say "I do not want to sift through all your recent claims.. I ask you to trust me... you are [not] going to talk me out of my position.... Lucky for you, we don't have to discuss epistemology"?

First, I should say that I dealt a little harshly with you in my last post, and I'm sorry; it was just from frustration.

To give you a sense of this frustration, consider this example. Suppose you know a good deal of physics, and wanted to make some point about physics. And I, knowing little about physics, but assuming that your theory must be wrong somehow, kept pestering you about the physics by asking questions and making claims that simply demonstrated my lack of understanding of physics. Wouldn't that be a bit frustrating for you? Wouldn't you want to say "look, physics is hard, I can't teach you in a few days why it works this way, and I'm a bit mystified about why you're so sure the physics is wrong when you don't know physics very well"?

That's a bit like the situation I'm in, except suppose now that you didn't have to make a point about physics in the first place--the other person keeps insisting on talking about physics when it is almost totally beside the point. Wouldn't you find that even more frustrating?

If my knowledge of epistemology is too crude, then it should take you seconds to show contradictions, but so far, my "crude" understanding of epistemology has shown contradictions in only your position.

I did point out some of your more serious howlers from the last post. I just didn't do anywhere near all of them, figuring it was counterproductive. And where is the "contradiction" you have found in my position?

Simply put, you have made no statement to the effect that your beliefs are as a result of how reality appears to us.

What? Look, part of what goes into the coherence hopper is how reality appears to us. And to a foundherentist such as myself, those perceptual representations are particularly important.

The most you have committed to is that core beliefs "may or may not be externally justified." That's not sufficient. What if a theist said that their beliefs on God, "may or may not have anything to do with the way the world appears"?

Another bad howler. How the world appears subjectively is not the same question as whether there is external justification. If you're asking me to prove my beliefs "externally justified", that's not something I can do, and that's part of what it is to be external justification. This problem affects your external pragmatism as much as any other external position. (How can you tell that the beliefs actually are effective, instead of merely appearing that way to you?)

It looks like you are encouraging dogmatism.

Yes, you have said many times that it "looks like" this to you. But I still don't see why.

This, I think, sums up your error in thought. You are not acknowledging the primacy of pragmatism over coherentism.

Okay, here at least you are trying to point out what's wrong with my theory. and I appreciate it. It involves a basic confusion, though: pragmatism and coherentism are simply not in competition. One is a theory about the structure of the justification relation, and one about the constitutive nature of justification.

Let me quote BonJour: ...

Yes, BonJour, himself a coherentist (at the time), considers this objection to the view in the context of his book defending coherentism (the book is actually The Structure of Empirical Knowledge). I think this objection has great force, but that the only reasonable response is to (a) go totally external in your justification, or (b) if you want to recover a reasonable internal, "available" justification, move to some form of foundherentism instead. I choose the latter since I think internal justification is crucially important.

Many pragmatists, on the other hand, would never put primary emphasis on coherence.

I don't know about "many"--I can't think of more than one or two. Mostly I know the coherentist pragmatists, like Carnap, Quine, Putnam, Harman, Churchland ...

If your point is that not every expert in the field has the exact suite of epistemological positions I do, yes, that's correct. But that doesn't show that my epistemology is dogmatic by a long shot. And more importantly, it doesn't somehow establish that belief in something controversial without reason is an okay thing to do--and that is your goal in this thread, right?

It makes no sense for me to reply if I fundamentally disagree with you but I am not allowed to talk about it.

You are allowed to talk about it. It's just frustrating when what you talk about is so confused and has nothing apparent to do with the point at hand.

I already showed that I'm not rejecting or accepting beliefs without a reason.

You did? Does this mean that you do think it's wrong to continue to believe something controversial without being able to give a reason? Because honest, in this thread, that's all I want to hear. Whether or not you like my epistemology (or your understanding of my epistemology), if we agree on this crucial point of this thread then we can move on to giving those reasons in other threads.

However, you failed to demonstrate that you are basing your beliefs on the world ...

Oh boy! If that's what you're asking of me, then no, I can't refute skepticism. And if you can, you should get it published right away! The world has been waiting for thousands of years for a good refutation of skepticism! Meanwhile all I can do is try to give good reasons for each of my beliefs. And are we agreed that you too think that's important?


spetey