Arguments and evidence for deism, theism, and miracles

[otseng]

We have agreed to debate the following:

Is there sufficient evidence to conclude the existence of a deistic God?

And if so, is there sufficient evidence to conclude a theistic worldview whereby this God intervenes in human affairs? Specifically, is there evidentiary justification for concluding that some claims of intervention are authentic whereas others aren't.

---

A thread has been created for followers of this debate to post comments:
http://debatingchristianity.com/forum/v ... hp?t=24538

[otseng]

You have declared that the assertion below is a premise of your argument: "A universe conducive to life is objectively and intrinsically better/superior/preferable/more desirable than a universe not conducive to life".

I will have to admit, your tactics are novel. I've never encountered anyone questioning this. But, I'll accept the challenge.

Let's clarify your position so I'll know what I need to defend.

Do you agree that accepting the implicit assumption that life is special is part of the fine-tuning argument?

Do you agree that life has more value than non-life? Or does a living organism have the same value as a non-living thing?

Do you agree that life displays more complexity than any non-life? Or does life have the same complexity as non-life?

Do you accept that humans have more value than animals that are non-human? Or do humans have the value as other animals?

[no evidence no belief]

You have declared that the assertion below is a premise of your argument: "A universe conducive to life is objectively and intrinsically better/superior/preferable/more desirable than a universe not conducive to life".

I will have to admit, your tactics are novel. I've never encountered anyone questioning this. But, I'll accept the challenge.

Let's clarify your position so I'll know what I need to defend.

ok

Do you agree that accepting the implicit assumption that life is special is part of the fine-tuning argument?

Yes. I proposed that, and went to some length to get you to admit it as well. That life is better than no-life is one of the several implicit premises of your argument, all of which will need to be demonstrated to be true before we can look at what conclusions these premises lead to.

Do you agree that life has more value than non-life? Or does a living organism have the same value as a non-living thing?

No, I do not think that life has more intrinsic objective value than non-life on a cosmic level. This is what you have to demonstrate is true before we move forward.

Sure, I personally would rather be alive than dead, but my survival instinct - which is just the product of evolution - is useful for surviving, but it does nothing to determine the intrinsic objective value of life as opposed to non-life.

Do you agree that life displays more complexity than any non-life? Or does life have the same complexity as non-life?

Yes, life tends to display more complexity per square inch than non-life.

Non-life has more simplicity per square inch than life.

Of course, since complexity is a "per inch" value, a large universe with no life could have greater overall complexity than a small universe with life. Do you accept this?

A few questions for you:
What is superior, complexity or simplicity? Why? And from who's prospective?

Life not only lacks the level of simplicity that non-life has, but also commonly lacks the durability of non-life, not to mention the temperature and density. The sun lacks the complexity of a cockroach, but the cockroach lacks the temperature of the sun. Which is intrinsically and objectively better, a cockroach or the sun?

Why is complexity a better scale to assess value of an object than, say, temperature? Why is "the more complex/simple the better" a reasonable scale to measure value, as opposed to "the hotter/colder the better"?

Do you agree that a loaf of bread infested with mold is more complex than an unblemished loaf of bread?

Do you agree that a computer infected with a bunch of viruses, spyware and trojan horses is more complex than a computer with a recently formatted hard drive?

Do you agree that a human body infested with cancer is more complex than a human body not infested with cancer?

Do you agree that the planet during world war 2 was more complex than before world war 2?

Do you accept that humans have more value than animals that are non-human?

No. I do not accept that. I mean, I feel that humans are more important. Guess why that is. It's because I'm human! I'm biased! From my prospective human life is more valuable than non-human. From my prospective MY children's life is more valuable than your life. From your prospective it's the other way round. From the prospective of a dog, her puppy's life is more valuable than your life. From the prospective of a chicken the life of a chicken is more valuable than human life. What does the entirely subjective assessment of value that any given organism gives itself have to do with anything? Your feeling that you are more precious than a chicken and a chicken's feeling that he is more precious than you is just the evolutionary product of survival instinct. What on earth does that have to do with the intrinsic value of life on a cosmic level?

[otseng]

Do you agree that accepting the implicit assumption that life is special is part of the fine-tuning argument?

Yes. I proposed that, and went to some length to get you to admit it as well. That life is better than no-life is one of the several implicit premises of your argument, all of which will need to be demonstrated to be true before we can look at what conclusions these premises lead to.

That's what I figured, but just wanted to make sure.

Would you agree then that anyone that says the universe seems fine-tuned has this implicit assumption? Also that anyone who says that fine-tuning is a problem has this implicit assumption?

Do you agree that life has more value than non-life? Or does a living organism have the same value as a non-living thing?

No, I do not think that life has more intrinsic objective value than non-life on a cosmic level. This is what you have to demonstrate is true before we move forward.

What do you mean by "non-life on a cosmic scale"? Does that mean on a micro scale life can have more value than non-life?

Sure, I personally would rather be alive than dead, but my survival instinct - which is just the product of evolution - is useful for surviving, but it does nothing to determine the intrinsic objective value of life as opposed to non-life.

Well, not just you personally, but that would be true for any life correct?

Do you agree that life displays more complexity than any non-life? Or does life have the same complexity as non-life?

Yes, life tends to display more complexity per square inch than non-life.

Generally, things more complex have more value. For example, a motorcycle is more complex than a bicycle, so it is more valuable than a bicycle. A computer is more complex than a calculator, so it is more valuable.

Non-life has more simplicity per square inch than life.

Generally, things that are simpler have less value. The exception that I can think of is if two things have equivalent purposes. If object A can achieve the same purpose as object B, but is simpler, it can be more valuable.

Of course, since complexity is a "per inch" value, a large universe with no life could have greater overall complexity than a small universe with life. Do you accept this?

Not really.

A few questions for you:
What is superior, complexity or simplicity? Why? And from who's prospective?

Of course, everything that we judge from is from our perspective. And from our perspective, things more complex generally have greater value.

Life not only lacks the level of simplicity that non-life has, but also commonly lacks the durability of non-life, not to mention the temperature and density.

Durability of non-life also point to fine-tuning. I'll talk about this more when I continue to discuss about the constants.

The sun lacks the complexity of a cockroach, but the cockroach lacks the temperature of the sun. Which is intrinsically and objectively better, a cockroach or the sun?

Temperature has nothing to do with value, whereas complexity does.

Do you agree that a computer infected with a bunch of viruses, spyware and trojan horses is more complex than a computer with a recently formatted hard drive?

Yes, because it took an intelligent agent to create computer malware. But if I drop a hard drive, it is not more complex than a brand new hard drive.

Do you agree that a human body infested with cancer is more complex than a human body not infested with cancer?

You'll have to use an example comparing non-life to life. Comparing life to life does not address how non-life relates to life.

Do you accept that humans have more value than animals that are non-human?

No. I do not accept that. I mean, I feel that humans are more important. Guess why that is. It's because I'm human! I'm biased! From my prospective human life is more valuable than non-human.

So you feel that humans are more valuable than non-humans, but you don't believe it? I do not find that to be a very consistent position.

[no evidence no belief]

Do you agree that accepting the implicit assumption that life is special is part of the fine-tuning argument?

Yes. I proposed that, and went to some length to get you to admit it as well. That life is better than no-life is one of the several implicit premises of your argument, all of which will need to be demonstrated to be true before we can look at what conclusions these premises lead to.

That's what I figured, but just wanted to make sure.

Would you agree then that anyone that says the universe seems fine-tuned has this implicit assumption?

Yes.

Also that anyone who says that fine-tuning is a problem has this implicit assumption?

I am not sure if I understand what you're saying, on a grammatical level. Sorry.

Argument A (fine tuning) is based among other things on implicit assumption X (that life is intrinsically and objectively superior to non-life).

If you accept argument A then you must accept assumption X. If you reject argument A on the basis of rejecting assumption X, then by definition you are rejecting assumption X.

So, if I understand your question, the answer is NO, "anyone who says fine-tuning is a problem" does NOT "have this implicit assumption". The exact opposite of that is true. Your question seems so utterly nonsensical that I earnestly think you must mean something other than what I think you mean.

Do you agree that life has more value than non-life? Or does a living organism have the same value as a non-living thing?

No, I do not think that life has more intrinsic objective value than non-life on a cosmic level. This is what you have to demonstrate is true before we move forward.

What do you mean by "non-life on a cosmic scale"? Does that mean on a micro scale life can have more value than non-life?

I reject the notion (and am waiting for you to prove me wrong) that life is intrinsically and objectively better/superior/preferable/more desirable than non-life.

I didn't word it well, but that's what I meant when I said "cosmic scale".

Obviously life can be better than non-life, and non-life can be preferable to life, depending on circumstances, from the subjective micro-scale point of view of some organisms.

For example, if there is a hungry human and a chicken in a room, from the point of view of the human, the life of the human and the non-life of the chicken is preferable. From the point of view of the chicken, the non-life of the human and the life of the chicken is preferable.

Sure, I personally would rather be alive than dead, but my survival instinct - which is just the product of evolution - is useful for surviving, but it does nothing to determine the intrinsic objective value of life as opposed to non-life.

Well, not just you personally, but that would be true for any life correct?

No. Just for sufficiently intelligent life. I don't think a virus, a fungus, a blade of grass, a worm, a lobster is intelligent enough to "prefer" life to non-life.

The whole concept of "preference" or of "x being better than y" is utterly meaningless in the absence of intelligence of some kind. That's my point.

I am beginning to thing that nothing is intrinsically and objectively better than anything else. Stuff is only better than other stuff from the subjective point of view of a particular being, and only if the being is sufficiently advanced to compute the notion of preference.

Your job is to demonstrate that logic and evidence support the notion that life is intrinsically and objectively better/superior/preferable/more desirable than non-life.

Do you agree that life displays more complexity than any non-life? Or does life have the same complexity as non-life?

Yes, life tends to display more complexity per square inch than non-life.

Generally, things more complex have more value. For example, a motorcycle is more complex than a bicycle, so it is more valuable than a bicycle. A computer is more complex than a calculator, so it is more valuable.

Are you saying that complexity is intrinsically and objectively more valuable than simplicity? If so, please present your argument for that premise.

Or are you saying that, in most cases, most human beings will pay more money for a complex thing than for a simple thing? (A noteworthy exception being diamonds, where the purity/simplicity of the carbon atom lattice is what drives the price up)

Non-life has more simplicity per square inch than life.

Generally, things that are simpler have less value. The exception that I can think of is if two things have equivalent purposes. If object A can achieve the same purpose as object B, but is simpler, it can be more valuable.

Who's purpose?

You are still talking exclusively about the personal subjective value that an object has, according to a person who is attempting to accomplish something.

You have to demonstrate that complexity is intrinsically and objectively superior. Not superior from the point of view of someone who is trying to accomplish something.

A few questions for you:
What is superior, complexity or simplicity? Why? And from who's prospective?

Of course, everything that we judge from is from our perspective. And from our perspective, things more complex generally have greater value.

Well ok then!

We are discussing whether anything is objectively and intrinsically better than something else.

We already agree that people have preferences. Members of PETA prefer animals to stay alive, hunters prefer them to be dead. Teens rushing to buy the Play station 4 prefer complexity, zen masters meditating on a mountain top prefer simplicity. Straight guys prefer women, gay guys prefer men. Newyorkers prefer the Yankees, Bostonians prefer the Red Sox. Etc, etc, etc.

I apologize. I now realize I should have asked my question directly, rather than rhetorically. Allow me to rectify that:

Please outline in what way is complexity intrinsically and objectively superior/better/preferable to simplicity.

In fact, please outline in what way is anything intrinsically and objectively superior/better/preferable to anything else. Either do that, or admit that the concept of something better than something else is meaningless in the absence of a sentient/intelligent/conscious being making that judgement.

The sun lacks the complexity of a cockroach, but the cockroach lacks the temperature of the sun. Which is intrinsically and objectively better, a cockroach or the sun?

Temperature has nothing to do with value, whereas complexity does.

Well, every single human being who ever lived disagrees with you, starting from the caveman who invented fire all the way down to the CEOs and stakeholders of the multinational multi-billion-dollar air-conditioning and heating industry. Temperature has value.

But this is all beside the point. These are personal and subjective assessments of value.

This debate is about anything having greater intrinsic and objective value than anything else. Can you mount some kind of argument for that? Or are you conceding that the concept of "intrinsic and objective value" is meaningless, and "value" only takes on meaning as a concept if one presupposes the existence of an entity that deems anything to have value?

Do you accept that humans have more value than animals that are non-human?

No. I do not accept that. I mean, I feel that humans are more important. Guess why that is. It's because I'm human! I'm biased! From my prospective human life is more valuable than non-human.

So you feel that humans are more valuable than non-humans, but you don't believe it? I do not find that to be a very consistent position.

Let me clarify.

My subjective personal position is that human life is more valuable than non-human life.

I do not believe that human life is intrinsically and objectively more valuable than non-human life. (I am aiting for you to provide evidence and logic in support of this intrinsic and objective superiority, or for you to concede that such evidence and logic does not exist)

It's similar to how my subjective personal position is that I love my wife more than any other woman in the world, but I do not believe that my wife is intrinsically and objectively the most lovable woman in the world.


In summary:

You have admitted that one of the necessary premises of your argument is that life is intrinsically and objectively better than non-life. The subjective preference of any individual is not relevant.

Please just demonstrate that the implicit premise of your argument is true. Namely, please demonstrate that life is intrinsically and objectively better/superior/preferable/more desirable than non-life.

Either do that, or admit that the concept of anything being superior to anything else, of necessity presupposes the antecedent existence of a being capable of making that judgement. Namely, admit that the concept of anything being better than anything else is meaningless other than as a description of a specific person/intelligence/being's personal and subjective preference.

Let me put it this way:
Imagine there was no life, intelligence, sentience at all anywhere at any time. No humans, no bacteria, no angels, no God, no Hobbits, no Santa. Nothing at all in existence anywhere inside or outside the universe, ever, other than inert matter/energy and/or vacuum/nothingness.

If life were intrinsically and objectively better than non-life, the statement "life is better than non-life" would still be true under those conditions, irrespective of whether anybody was there to formulate that statement, much like "Two plus two makes four" and "A cannot be not-A" would still be true.

Is that a position you can support? Can you demonstrate that "life is intrinsically and objectively better/superior/preferable/more desirable than non-life"?

If not, the only alternative is that "life is better than non-life"... TO SOMEONE.

If "life is better than non-life" isn't an objective intrinsic truth, it must be a subjective personal truth. Therefore someone must exist, for whom "life is better than non-life" is a personal and subjective truth. The only way for the fine-tuning argument to remain viable is if you presuppose that an intelligent entity for whom "life is better than non-life" exists, and of necessity it must exist outside of the universe.

In that case, my question is this: Who's existence do you have to presuppose in order to demonstrate that the fine-tuned argument is true and that therefore God exists?


1) A exists
2) Therefore B is a valid argument for A
3) Therefore A exists

What do you call an argument where a premise is the conclusion and the conclusion is a premise?

Here's a hint/visual aid:

[no evidence no belief]

Oliver, here is my counterargument to fine tuning (fyi, I have two additional preliminary counters based on implicit premises to fine-tuning, as well as my main counter)

Axiom 1: A logical argument where one of its premises is also one of its conclusions is circular and flawed. No matter how compelling or boring, no matter how simple or sophisticated, no matter how novel or predictable, any argument where the conclusion is the same as one of the premises can be immediately and permanently discarded as flawed.

Syllogism 1
1) The notion that when the universe was created, one set of physical constants was preferable to other sets of physical constants, is one of the premises of the argument from fine-tuning.
2) The concept of something being preferable to something else is necessarily contingent on the existence of an entity capable of having a preference - an intelligent entity.
3) Therefore the existence of an intelligent entity antecedent to the universe is a premise of the argument from fine tuning

Syllogism 2
1) The existence of an intelligent entity antecedent to the universe is a premise of the argument from fine tuning (as per syllogism 1 above).
2) The existence of an intelligent entity antecedent to the universe is a conclusion of the argument from fine tuning.
3) Therefore the argument from fine tuning has one of its premises as its conclusion, and is therefore circular, and therefore fails (as per Axiom 1 above)


I'll provide the same argument in even simpler form.

Syllogism 1
1) B is a premise of argument A
2) C is a premise of B
3) Therefore C is a premise of argument A

Syllogism 2
1) C is a premise of argument A
2) C is a conclusion of argument A
3) Argument A is circular


In even simpler form!

You are saying this: "God exists, therefore fine-tuning is true, therefore God exists".

That's no more of a valid logical argument than this: "Superman exists, therefore the DC comics are true, therefore Superman exists".

Do you concede?

[otseng]

Don't have a lot of time now, so I'll have to make this brief (or at least try to).

Would you agree then that anyone that says the universe seems fine-tuned has this implicit assumption?

Yes.

OK

Also that anyone who says that fine-tuning is a problem has this implicit assumption?

I am not sure if I understand what you're saying, on a grammatical level. Sorry.

Let me put it this way.

In post 110, I presented articles saying that fine-tuning is a problem in regards to the fine structure constant. Do all these make the implicit assumption that life is better than non-life?

RICHARD FEYNMAN, Nobel laureate and physicist extraordinaire, called it a magic number and its value one of the greatest damn mysteries of physics. The number he was referring to, which goes by the symbol alpha and the rather more long-winded name of the fine-structure constant, is magic indeed. If it were a mere 4% bigger or smaller than it is, stars would not be able to sustain the nuclear reactions that synthesise carbon and oxygen. One consequence would be that squishy, carbon-based life would not exist.

http://www.economist.com/node/16930866

One of the most controversial questions in cosmology is why the fundamental constants of nature seem fine-tuned for life. One of these fundamental constants is the fine-structure constant, or alpha, which is the coupling constant for the electromagnetic force and equal to about 1/137.0359. If alpha were just 4% bigger or smaller than it is, stars wouldn't be able to make carbon and oxygen, which would have made it impossible for life as we know it to exist.

http://phys.org/news202921592.html

If alpha [the fine-structure constant] were bigger than it really is, we should not be able to distinguish matter from ether [the vacuum, nothingness], and our task to disentangle the natural laws would be hopelessly difficult. The fact however that alpha has just its value 1/137 is certainly no chance but itself a law of nature. It is clear that the explanation of this number must be the central problem of natural philosophy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine_stru ... ant#Quotes

There is speculation that the fine-structure constant is not actually constant throughtout the universe, but varies at different points. But, this only strengthens the fine-tuning argument because the fine-tuning constant allows our region in space to have life.

Now, results from a new study show that alpha seems to have varied a tiny bit in different directions of the universe billions of years ago, being slightly smaller in the northern hemisphere and slightly larger in the southern hemisphere. One intriguing possible implication is that the fine-structure constant is continuously varying in space, and seems fine-tuned for life in our neighborhood of the universe.

http://phys.org/news202921592.html

Obviously life can be better than non-life, and non-life can be preferable to life, depending on circumstances, from the subjective micro-scale point of view of some organisms.

For example, if there is a hungry human and a chicken in a room, from the point of view of the human, the life of the human and the non-life of the chicken is preferable. From the point of view of the chicken, the non-life of the human and the life of the chicken is preferable.

I'm not talking about individual circumstances like it would be better for Hitler to not have existed than to have existed. I'm talking about life in general.

The whole concept of "preference" or of "x being better than y" is utterly meaningless in the absence of intelligence of some kind. That's my point.

I would actually agree with that. However, since we are intelligent, we can make such a statement.

I am beginning to thing that nothing is intrinsically and objectively better than anything else. Stuff is only better than other stuff from the subjective point of view of a particular being, and only if the being is sufficiently advanced to compute the notion of preference.

Then that would throw out morality and ethics. If a particular person feels that it is better for him to kill another person, then that is his preference and cannot be considered to be wrong.

Your job is to demonstrate that logic and evidence support the notion that life is intrinsically and objectively better/superior/preferable/more desirable than non-life.

I would consider this to be a properly basic belief. People intuitively feel that life/living is better than non-life/dead.

Or are you saying that, in most cases, most human beings will pay more money for a complex thing than for a simple thing? (A noteworthy exception being diamonds, where the purity/simplicity of the carbon atom lattice is what drives the price up)

Diamonds that are cut (more complex) are more expensive than an uncut diamond (not complex).

In fact, please outline in what way is anything intrinsically and objectively superior/better/preferable to anything else. Either do that, or admit that the concept of something better than something else is meaningless in the absence of a sentient/intelligent/conscious being making that judgement.

Yes, I agree that it would be meaningless without a sentient being. But, since we are sentient beings, we can make that judgement.

Temperature has nothing to do with value, whereas complexity does.

Well, every single human being who ever lived disagrees with you, starting from the caveman who invented fire all the way down to the CEOs and stakeholders of the multinational multi-billion-dollar air-conditioning and heating industry. Temperature has value.

Temperature only has value when harnessed through intelligent means.

Do you accept that humans have more value than animals that are non-human?

No. I do not accept that. I mean, I feel that humans are more important. Guess why that is. It's because I'm human! I'm biased! From my prospective human life is more valuable than non-human.

So you feel that humans are more valuable than non-humans, but you don't believe it? I do not find that to be a very consistent position.

Let me clarify.

My subjective personal position is that human life is more valuable than non-human life.

That is all that is necessary for my argument. From people's perspective, including yours, human life is more valuable than non-human life.

Oliver, here is my counterargument to fine tuning (fyi, I have two additional preliminary counters based on implicit premises to fine-tuning, as well as my main counter)

Syllogism 1
1) The notion that when the universe was created, one set of physical constants was preferable to other sets of physical constants, is one of the premises of the argument from fine-tuning.
2) The concept of something being preferable to something else is necessarily contingent on the existence of an entity capable of having a preference - an intelligent entity.
3) Therefore the existence of an intelligent entity antecedent to the universe is a premise of the argument from fine tuning

Syllogism 2
1) The existence of an intelligent entity antecedent to the universe is a premise of the argument from fine tuning (as per syllogism 1 above).
2) The existence of an intelligent entity antecedent to the universe is a conclusion of the argument from fine tuning.
3) Therefore the argument from fine tuning has one of its premises as its conclusion, and is therefore circular, and therefore fails (as per Axiom 1 above)

In Syllogism 1, the intelligent entities in premise 2 and 3 are different.

In Syllogism 2, there is nobody that asserts premise 1. Certainly I have not done so.

Neither me, nor anyone else, in discussing the fine-tuning argument first assumes that God exists. I will grant that it assumes that sentient beings exist in the universe, but it does not assume any intelligent creator must exist.

[no evidence no belief]

Ok, let's go through this one more time.

You have agreed that one of the implicit premises of the argument from fine-tuning is that something is preferable to something else. Specifically, that a universe conducive to life is preferable to a universe not conducive to life. In other words, the fine tuning argument is necessarily contingent on something being preferable to something else. If it's not true that something is preferable to something else, then fine-tuning is not true. Do you still stand by that position?

In your last post, you've agreed in no uncertain terms that the notion of something "being preferable" is meaningless in the absence of an entity capable of having a preference. In other words, something being preferable is necessarily contingent on the existence of an entity capable of having a preference. If an entity capable of having a preference doesn't exist, then the concept of something being preferable is meaningless. Do you still stand by that position?

If so, let's recap what we have so far: Fine tuning is contingent on something being preferable, and something being preferable is contingent on the existence of an entity capable of having a preference. Therefore fine tuning is contingent on the existence of an entity capable of having a preference.

1) A is only true if B is true
2) B is only true if C is true
3) Therefore A is only true if C is true.

Are you with me so far?

Fine tuning presupposes the existence of intelligence. Ok?

Now, I have two simple questions for you:

1) Can an intelligent entity have a preference IF IT DOES NOT EXIST YET?

2) Did humans exist when the physical constants were set to what they are?

It's so simple. I can't believe you don't get it. Let's try an analogy.

For the purpose of this argument, ignore the notion of unplanned pregnancy - assume that all pregnancies are always planned.

In that case, the existence of a person (let's call him Steve) would be necessarily contingent on his existence being preferable over his non-existence. The notion of Steve's existence being preferable would be necessarily contingent on the existence of a person capable of having a preference (Steve's parents, I'd assume).

Now, we may not know who the parents of any given person are. In other words, we might not know who the intelligent entity was that found Steve's existence preferable to his non-existence. Nonetheless, we can say for sure that the entity that found Steve's existence preferable WAS NOT STEVE. Why not? Because Steve didn't exist yet when that preference manifested itself.


Did any of the intelligent entities that are the product of the universe exist when the universe didn't exist yet?

Nonetheless, fine-tuning presupposes that an intelligent entity existed when the universe didn't exist.

So, if an intelligent entity that is inside the universe couldn't have existed when the universe didn't exist, the only other option is the existence of an intelligent entity outside the universe - God.

Therefore fine-tuning presupposes the existence of God. Therefore it's a circular argument.



Look, if you can't follow any of what I wrote above, just answer me this:

If the universe was fine-tuned, when was it fine-tuned?

[no evidence no belief]

I don't know in how many ways I can state the obvious, but I'm going to keep trying:

"If entity A can only exist once event B has already happened, then entity A did not exist before event B happened"

Do you agree with that statement?

Here's another wording of it: If A is contingent on B, then B cannot be contingent on A.

Do you accept that?

If A presupposes B, then B cannot presuppose A. Got it?

Entity A cannot be presupposed to have been involved in an event that happened before entity A began to exist.

Do you accept that?

If Steve was born in 1980, he could not have been involved in Julius Caesar's assassination. Cool?

If intelligent life in the universe began millions of years after the big bang at the very earliest, then intelligent life could not have been in any way involved in the big bang.

So, intelligence from inside the universe cannot be presupposed to have existed at the time the physical constants began to exist. Nonetheless, fine-tuning presupposes that some kind of intelligence existed at the time the physical constants began to exist. If this intelligent being which must exist for fine-tuning to be valid CANNOT be inside the universe, where's the only other place it could be?

Fine-tuning presupposes an intelligent entity existing outside the universe.

It also concludes that. Therefore it's circular. Period.

1) Fine tuning presupposes that an intelligent being existed AT THE TIME THE PHYSICAL CONSTANTS BEGAN TO EXIST.
2) Intelligent beings inside the universe did not exist at that time
3) Therefore fine tuning must presuppose the existence on an intelligent entity outside the universe.
4) The existence of an intelligent entity outside the universe is an implicit premise of fine-tuning, and it is also a conclusion of fine-tuning. Therefore Fine-tuning is circular.

[otseng]

Fine tuning presupposes the existence of intelligence. Ok?

You are confusing between the intelligence of the observer and the intelligence of a creator. Yes, I agree that fine-tuning presupposes an observer having intelligence. But, it does not presuppose the existence of an intelligent creator.

In order for it to be a circular argument, you have to show that it presupposes an intelligent creator, not an intelligent observer.

1) Can an intelligent entity have a preference IF IT DOES NOT EXIST YET?

2) Did humans exist when the physical constants were set to what they are?

It's so simple. I can't believe you don't get it.

You claim that I have a circular argument. So, no, I don't see how you have shown that my argument is circular.

Let's try an analogy.

For the purpose of this argument, ignore the notion of unplanned pregnancy - assume that all pregnancies are always planned.

In that case, the existence of a person (let's call him Steve) would be necessarily contingent on his existence being preferable over his non-existence. The notion of Steve's existence being preferable would be necessarily contingent on the existence of a person capable of having a preference (Steve's parents, I'd assume).

Now, we may not know who the parents of any given person are. In other words, we might not know who the intelligent entity was that found Steve's existence preferable to his non-existence. Nonetheless, we can say for sure that the entity that found Steve's existence preferable WAS NOT STEVE. Why not? Because Steve didn't exist yet when that preference manifested itself.

I read this several times and I have no idea what you are getting at.

Did any of the intelligent entities that are the product of the universe exist when the universe didn't exist yet?

No.

Nonetheless, fine-tuning presupposes that an intelligent entity existed when the universe didn't exist.

You are conflating two different intelligent entities - observers and a creator.

So, if an intelligent entity that is inside the universe couldn't have existed when the universe didn't exist, the only other option is the existence of an intelligent entity outside the universe - God.

Let me see if I got you right.

There are only two possible cases:
- Intelligent entities exist in our universe
- Intelligent entities exist outside our universe

If the universe was fine-tuned, when was it fine-tuned?

At the moment when the universe began to exist.

Let me ask again, in post 110, I presented articles saying that fine-tuning is a problem in regards to the fine structure constant. Do all these make the implicit assumption that life is better than non-life?

[no evidence no belief]

[Replying to post 127 by otseng]
This changes everything.

You are saying that the concept of fine-tuning presupposes an intelligent entity which prefers something over something else, but that this intelligent entity need not have had anything to do with that something coming into being.

All you have to presuppose for fine-tuning to be viable, is that any entity ever, at any point in the future, no matter how completely unrelated to the events, prefers something over something else.

By that definition, the rock in your front yard is most definitely a viable candidate for fine-tuning.

We cannot agree on whether or not fine-tuning was or was not involved in the actual process of that rock ending up there, but that does NOT matter. Decades later you find yourself preferring the rock's presence in your front yard to its absence, therefore it might have been fine tuned.

Your new definition of fine-tuning is this "Something that was not necessarily fine-tuned, but which somebody in the distant future finds preferable to alternatives".


Seriously. Think about it.

Assume X was NOT fine tuned by anybody. It came into existence by purely random blind chance, in the complete absence of intelligence, intentionality or preference of any kind.

10 billion years later, a dog sees object X and chooses to pee on it rather than peeing elsewhere. This intelligent entity exhibited a preference for this object over something else.

By your definition of fine-tuning and its necessary implicit premises, this object which was not fine tuned could potentially be fine tuned because a dog preferred it to alternatives.

So, do you agree that your new definition of fine-tuning is "an object which was not necessarily fine tuned, and instead was caused by completely random blind chance in the complete absence of intelligence, intentionality and preference, but which was peed on by a dog billions of years later"?

Or do you agree that the definition of fine tuning based on the presupposition that a subsequent preference in the far future by an unrelated entity is meaningless, and that fine-tuning must presuppose an intelligent entity with preference AT THE TIME THE FINE TUNING TAKES PLACE?

Which of these two does fine-tuning presuppose?

1) That something which was NOT fine tuned... was fine tuned as long as a dog pees on it 10 billion years later

or

2) That an intelligent entity capable of having a preference existed at the time the universe began to exist?