Why Free Will is an illusion

[Miles]

Interest in free will has usually centered around the affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Some very interesting thoughts on both sides have come out of these discussions, many well thought out and others not so much. Whatever the case, there's been a frequent problem with some of the terms involved, most often those concerning "free will" and "will."

As I see it, free will is important to many because without it would mean each of is nothing more than an automaton, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If I have no freedom of choice how can I be blamed for what I do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given.

Any exception to free will is commonly seen as temporary constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the issue of free will is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think a decent working definition of "free will" is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished.

Those who most disagree with this are the hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused then we could not have done differently, therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic level: Are we free to do other than what we chose or not? I say, No you are not. Free will is an illusion. But before going into why, we first need to get rid of the term "choice" because it assumes to be true the condition under consideration, freedom to do what we want. So no use of "choice," "choosing,"chosen," or any other form of the word.


There are only two ways in which actions can take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, appears to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway; completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that negate any randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless the causes leading to the event had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. There was no freedom to do any differently.

What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, the will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..

Of course this means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. If you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .

Any disagreements?

[FinalEnigma]

.

Sorry for cutting to the chase here, but I'm having one heck of a time properly configuring all the dialog in proper {quote} {/quote} form.

I'm not certain where precisely our line of disagreement is here. I'm thinking it may be a semantic matter.

I would not say that the outcome of my proposed wizard battle is entirely random, even though it uses randomness in the fireball damage. It is uncertain which wizard will win, but we can estimate the probability.

Looking back at proposal I was initially responding to, I suspect it is here:

You argued that a given event either has a cause, or is completely random.

Actually, my argument is very simple: There are only two ways in which an event arises, either it is caused or it is not caused. If it is caused then it is determined (by these causes). If it is not caused then it must pop up randomly---absolutely randomly.

I believe you are lumping in my probabilistic state with one of your other states.
I perceive the possible ways by which an even can happen(say the stronger wizard winning the dual) I perceive to be

1) random, where all or a majority of all things are determined by randomness. There is no predictable way to determine who the victorious wizard will be.

2) wholly determined, where everything is deterministic and randomness has no play. We can guarantee that the stronger wizard will win.

or

3) probabilistic, where a some things are determined by direct cause and effect chains, but with some elements of randomness. We can determine that there is a greater probability that the stronger wizard will win (something like 63%, if I'm imagining the probabilities correctly), because even though some elements are determined (stronger wizard has more health), and some are random(fireball damage within the range), the end result is a mixture of both.

But we aren't dealing with probability, such as the chance X will occur before Y occurs. We're dealing with the why of the probability. In determinism the operational engine of the "why" is cause/effect and the probability is 1, a certainty.

Where absolute randomness is inserted into the equation the operational engine of the "why" is the fickle nature of quantum mechanics, which expresses itself as absolute uncertainty. And it's for this reason that no probability can be assigned to the stronger wizard. So in the end we're still left with only the two modes of operation.

That's simply not correct. the outcome of random events can be probabilistically assessed. http://www.unc.edu/~nielsen/soci708/mod ... 08mod4.pdf

in a random even, the probability of each outcome is identical. If it wasn't, it wouldn't be random - it would be weighted.

In the example of the wizards, in order for the weaker wizard to win, he would have to average approximately 13 more damage per fireball than the stronger wizard, and because in a random event, all outcomes are equally probable, it is more likely that the weaker wizard will NOT have such a beneficial outcome than that he will.

Thus, including true randomness does NOT inhibit our ability to use probabilistic assessment.

In real life, the outcomes of actual random events can be assessed based on probability distributions.

[Miles]

.

Sorry for cutting to the chase here, but I'm having one heck of a time properly configuring all the dialog in proper {quote} {/quote} form.

I'm not certain where precisely our line of disagreement is here. I'm thinking it may be a semantic matter.

I would not say that the outcome of my proposed wizard battle is entirely random, even though it uses randomness in the fireball damage. It is uncertain which wizard will win, but we can estimate the probability.

Looking back at proposal I was initially responding to, I suspect it is here:

You argued that a given event either has a cause, or is completely random.

Actually, my argument is very simple: There are only two ways in which an event arises, either it is caused or it is not caused. If it is caused then it is determined (by these causes). If it is not caused then it must pop up randomly---absolutely randomly.

I believe you are lumping in my probabilistic state with one of your other states.
I perceive the possible ways by which an even can happen(say the stronger wizard winning the dual) I perceive to be

1) random, where all or a majority of all things are determined by randomness. There is no predictable way to determine who the victorious wizard will be.

2) wholly determined, where everything is deterministic and randomness has no play. We can guarantee that the stronger wizard will win.

or

3) probabilistic, where a some things are determined by direct cause and effect chains, but with some elements of randomness. We can determine that there is a greater probability that the stronger wizard will win (something like 63%, if I'm imagining the probabilities correctly), because even though some elements are determined (stronger wizard has more health), and some are random(fireball damage within the range), the end result is a mixture of both.

But we aren't dealing with probability, such as the chance X will occur before Y occurs. We're dealing with the why of the probability. In determinism the operational engine of the "why" is cause/effect and the probability is 1, a certainty.

Where absolute randomness is inserted into the equation the operational engine of the "why" is the fickle nature of quantum mechanics, which expresses itself as absolute uncertainty. And it's for this reason that no probability can be assigned to the stronger wizard. So in the end we're still left with only the two modes of operation.

That's simply not correct. the outcome of random events can be probabilistically assessed. http://www.unc.edu/~nielsen/soci708/mod ... 08mod4.pdf

in a random even, the probability of each outcome is identical. If it wasn't, it wouldn't be random - it would be weighted.

In the example of the wizards, in order for the weaker wizard to win, he would have to average approximately 13 more damage per fireball than the stronger wizard, and because in a random event, all outcomes are equally probable, it is more likely that the weaker wizard will NOT have such a beneficial outcome than that he will.

Thus, including true randomness does NOT inhibit our ability to use probabilistic assessment.

In real life, the outcomes of actual random events can be assessed based on probability distributions.

You're right, I misspoke when I said "And it's for this reason that no probability can be assigned to the stronger wizard." Thank you for the correction.

[FinalEnigma]

You're right, I misspoke when I said "And it's for this reason that no probability can be assigned to the stronger wizard." Thank you for the correction.

Great! We've refined a stronger, or at least more clear, argument.

For reference, I do agree with your conclusion, or at the least, I do not know of any successful arguments against it.

[Sapphire]

[Replying to Miles]

People exercise freewill everyday. People (in general) exercise freewill every single day and night.

People choose all the time. Some make good choices and others make bad ones. And those who make bad or good choices... reap the consequences of it. The consequences are not unreasonable...they will produce after it's kind. So, people cannot blame God for their bad choices.

[marco]

That's simply not correct. the outcome of random events can be probabilistically assessed. http://www.unc.edu/~nielsen/soci708/mod ... 08mod4.pdf

in a random even, the probability of each outcome is identical. If it wasn't, it wouldn't be random - it would be weighted.

This is incorrect. The probability of a each random outcome is not identical, unless you have, perhaps, a UNIFORM distribution. There are many types of probability distributions: Poisson, Normal, hypergeometric, Binomial...

When you throw a die it is true that you have each score with probability 1/6, and that is called a uniform distribution for these events. The probability of obtaining, a number divisible by 3 or not divisible by 3 is 1/3 and 2/3. Random events don't in general occur with equal probability.

[marco]

And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, the will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..

Of course this means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. If you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .

Any disagreements?

The hypothesis looks sound enough but I believe it is one that cannot by its formulation admit of any counterexamples; it is effectively stating nothing since every circumstance you could think of can be made to fit the hypothesis. If we say all people are selfish we can extend the definition of selfish to an extent that the statement is always true, and so it is valueless. So too with the free will statement.

Confronted with what seems a free choice we take course A. We are not perfect creatures and we all work with flawed mechanisms, but mechanisms that allow us a degree of choice, despite their shortcomings. There are some whose mechanisms are so flawed that free choice is removed. There are youngsters who make decisions with limited responsibility. The fact that we can observe gradation in choice, indicates we have varying degrees of freedom. But this is all beside the point.

To say every choice is fixed, not free, is saying nothing of any consequence.

[Miles]

The hypothesis looks sound enough but I believe it is one that cannot by its formulation admit of any counterexamples;

What kind of counterexamples are you thinking of?

it is effectively stating nothing since every circumstance you could think of can be made to fit the hypothesis. If we say all people are selfish we can extend the definition of selfish to an extent that the statement is always true, and so it is valueless. So too with the free will statement.

Then I can only ask, so what?

To say every choice is fixed, not free, is saying nothing of any consequence.

You can concluded whatever you want from the implications of determinism; however, most people rebel at the thought that they have no such a thing as a freewill.

[marco]

The hypothesis looks sound enough but I believe it is one that cannot by its formulation admit of any counterexamples;

What kind of counterexamples are you thinking of?

ANY. That is the point. Anything under the sun that is brought against the hypothesis is met by the equivalent of an extended definition, so that the hypothesis admits all claims. It is therefore known as a bogus hypothesis.

it is effectively stating nothing since every circumstance you could think of can be made to fit the hypothesis. If we say all people are selfish we can extend the definition of selfish to an extent that the statement is always true, and so it is valueless. So too with the free will statement.

Then I can only ask, so what?

Such a statement says NOTHING. One can ignore it. It carries no information - though it may SEEM to. It is like saying: a dog is a dog.

You can concluded whatever you want from the implications of determinism; however, most people rebel at the thought that they have no such a thing as a freewill.

They can rebel all they want. Your hypothesis doesn't tell them they've no free will. The nearest it comes to making a statement is ....every action has a cause. As I said, you can see instances of choice by looking at situations where choice is absent, then limited. Your hypothesis seems to say something useful but on examination it says nothing at all.

[Miles]

The hypothesis looks sound enough but I believe it is one that cannot by its formulation admit of any counterexamples;

Anything under the sun that is brought against the hypothesis is met by the equivalent of an extended definition, so that the hypothesis admits all claims. It is therefore known as a bogus hypothesis.


it is effectively stating nothing since every circumstance you could think of can be made to fit the hypothesis. If we say all people are selfish we can extend the definition of selfish to an extent that the statement is always true, and so it is valueless. So too with the free will statement.

Such a statement says NOTHING. One can ignore it. It carries no information - though it may SEEM to. It is like saying: a dog is a dog.

They can rebel all they want. Your hypothesis doesn't tell them they've no free will. The nearest it comes to making a statement is ....every action has a cause. As I said, you can see instances of choice by looking at situations where choice is absent, then limited. Your hypothesis seems to say something useful but on examination it says nothing at all.

Dismiss it as you like, and for whatever irrelevant reasons you care to concoct, whether it's its structure or content, but your message here is quite clear; you're unable to counter the conclusion of the case I've presented.

[marco]

Dismiss it as you like, and for whatever irrelevant reasons you care to concoct, whether it's its structure or content, but your message here is quite clear; you're unable to counter the conclusion of the case I've presented.

Oh, well. A standard approach in philosophy is to examine the authenticity of a hypothesis by postulating possible counterexamples, and seeing in which circumstances they apply. You say I am unable to counter .... I know. NOTHING counters it. It's not wrong - it is empty of meaning. I'm not being disparaging, simply concluding.

I showed you that there are degrees of freedom of will so this permits decisions to be made with responsibility.