Special Relativity and God

[McCulloch]

Unicorn has pointed me to The Special Theory of Relativity and Theories of Divine Eternity by William Lane Craig. Now, Craig is a theologian not a theoretical physicist but he seems to raise some interesting points.

My question for debate is, if there is an omnipresent god then must he also be timeless, omnitemporal according to special relativity? If relativity is true and god is omnipresent (that is he is in all places simultaneously), then he must also be in all space|time as well. If one believes in such a god, then how could a deterministic theology be avoided?

Here is another resource which seems to address this issue
Problems with John Earman’s Attempt to Reconcile Theism with General Relativity by Quentin Smith

[harvey1]

My question for debate is, if there is an omnipresent god then must he also be timeless, omnitemporal according to special relativity? If relativity is true and god is omnipresent (that is he is in all places simultaneously), then he must also be in all space|time as well. If one believes in such a god, then how could a deterministic theology be avoided?

I'm not sure if a temporal God is consistent with SRT. If SRT is just an approximation, then I would imagine that God could be a temporal being like Craig suggests. However, I personally don't think of God as a temporal being.

As far as deterministic theology, my answer here is very complex (and very Davidsonian-like; i.e., constructed from Donald Davidson's radical interpretationalist philosophy).

I don't think there is a contradiction between the future being fully known by God, and the future being weakly deterministic. Let me define my terms:

1. Strong determinism: The past strongly determines the future if and only if for any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any individuals (/objects) x in w1 and y in w2, if x in w1 is past-indiscernible from y in w2, then x in w1 is future-indiscernible from y in w2.
2. Moderate determinism: The past moderately determines the future if and only if for any possible world w and any individuals (/objects) x and y in w, if x and y are past-indiscernible in w, then they are future-indiscernible in w.
3. Weak determinism: A set of predicates S that is true of the past weakly determines a predicate p about the future if for any individuals (/objects) x and y in w, if p is true of the future for x and not of y, then there is a predicate of S concerning the past that is true of x and not true of y.

Notice that (1) makes it metaphysically impossible for there to exist any kind of indeterminism. If our world and our sister world in a parallel universe share the exact same past (i.e., past-indiscernible), then we have the same future (i.e., future-indiscernible) no matter what. Our laws are completely deterministic even across worlds, so there's no chance that a indeterministic event can happen (e.g., free will).

With (2), there's some indeterminism possible if the laws of the universe in the parallel universe can indeterministically cause our parallel world to suddenly depart from the way our world operates. However, if we assume this world to be the only world, then there is no indeterminism allowed. Still a problem for free will since if an indeterministic event happens, it is still not a free action, at best it's a random action where we have no control.

With (3), there are three factors that are required to capture the notion of weak determinism:

1. The individuals (/objects) x and y must share all the same behaviors (/observables) to be past-indiscernible
2. The individuals (/objects) x and y must share all the same relations to the same exact environment to be past-indiscernible
3. The predicate p that is true of the future as well as the set of predicates S that is true of the past requires a proper translation such that the interpretation can be properly fixed as to what is the truth of the matter between x and y. Fortunately, there are no independent facts of the matter about certain facts of w.

So, with (3c) there is the introduction of some indeterminism even in a fully (weakly) deterministic world. Certain deterministic "facts" require a principle of charity that considers multiple interpretations. This introduces indeterminism within a timeless God theology while still maintaining that the future is temporally determined (which it must be in order to say that the future and past are omni-complete from God's timeless perspective).

[McCulloch]

Let me restate just a little bit. One of the consequences of relativity is that we can no longer see time as separate from space. Instead of the classical three dimensional space we are confronted with a four dimensional space|time.
So instead of specifying a place by the three dimensions of space, relative to a frame of reference, we must now specify an event by the four dimensions of space and time relative to a frame of reference.

Classic Christianity postulates that their God inhabits all space, that is God is omnipresent. But if God inhabits all of the points in space in all frames of reference, God must also inhabit all points of time as well. To an omnipresent being, if such a thing is possible, all time must be observable as well. He knows the end from the beginning.

[harvey1]

But if God inhabits all of the points in space in all frames of reference, God must also inhabit all points of time as well. To an omnipresent being, if such a thing is possible, all time must be observable as well. He knows the end from the beginning.

I think I have a clear picture of what you want to say, but my point was that you can have free will under a weak deterministic world (i.e., a world that has some indeterminism meaning that no law determines the outcome). Let me put it this way. God has causal knowledge of the world and zero time knowledge of the world.

The causal knowledge comes from the effect following the cause. This is the aspect of reality which has indeterministic elements. For example, free will decisions are not certain since by definition people are free to be whatever they decide to be. God possesses causal knowledge (i.e., 100% certainty) of our free will decisions only (causally) after we make the decision.

The zero time knowledge comes from the causes and effects of the world all happening at the same zero instant. The passage of time is an illusion, and God exists outside of that illusion. So, since from God's perspective the events of our present frame of reference (FOR) happen at zero time (from God's perspective), and the events of our future FOR happen at zero time (from God's perspective), therefore God has knowledge of all the events of past, present, future happening all at the same time (in a zero instant). So, God knows our future because it is "now" to God. However, it is our free will choices in the future because the free will action (effect) follows from our free will decision (cause). This free will decision is indeterministic with respect to its cause since there is no causal law or fixed future that makes it that way. We make it that way.... in our future. God possesses knowledge of it because of the zero time aspect of God's omnipresence.

Regarding SRT and GRT, these theories do not change this at all. The past and future are "there" for us to visit (if we could do so through a wormhole) since all events happen in zero time. This doesn't mean that the future is fully deterministic since there is an element of the world (e.g., free will) where no laws exist to determine the cause. If there are no laws to determine the effect, the cause is indeterministic. What determines the effect for free will decisions? Free will actions. When is that decided? In our future where God exists already since there is (in reality as we do not yet see it) zero time between now and our future.

[McCulloch]

Thank you Harvey. I think that you have answered the primary question about omnipresence very well. Even I understood it, and I sometimes get rather confused by this stuff.

However, I am not sure that I agree with you about the determinist thought. If a God created the universe, exists in a timeless state, and is omnipotent (leaving aside for the time being the definition of omnipotent) then wouldn't you also have to argue that this is the absolute best possible universe (from the God prospective). Otherwise, he would have done it differently. This seems to be at odds with the Biblical idea that "Straight and Narrow is the Gate that Leads to life there be few that find it. But Wide is the Path that leads to death and destruction many people will go that way." Is that the best that God could possibly do?

[harvey1]

If a God created the universe, exists in a timeless state, and is omnipotent (leaving aside for the time being the definition of omnipotent) then wouldn't you also have to argue that this is the absolute best possible universe (from the God prospective).

Yes, it is the best possible Universe in terms of the whole structure of material reality--but not necessarily the best possible universe in terms of our particular slice of that best possible state. As an example, the best possible human being--the ideal person--might be our neighbor but not us. Similarly, in the end in terms of what really matters, we might be the ideal person, just not now.

"Straight and Narrow is the Gate that Leads to life there be few that find it. But Wide is the Path that leads to death and destruction many people will go that way." Is that the best that God could possibly do?

I think a path integral formulation for salvation is perfectly consistent for God, don't you?...