Fine tuning of the Universe

[Mr.Badham]

I'm confused, because it seems like the argument could go both ways.

Either the universe is fine tuned for life, and therefore is full of it, or only Earth is fine tuned for life, and the rest of the universe will have none of it.

I want theists to take a stand right here and say;

The universe is fine tuned, and is full of life.

Or

The Earth is fine tuned, the rest of the universe has none of it.

Then I want you to stake your religiosity on it. If you make the claim, one way or the other, and are shown to be wrong, you will then become an atheist.

If you are not willing to do this, I would like you to proclaim that the argument is bogus, and should never be used.

You have 1 of 3 options;
The universe is full of life.
Only earth has life.
The fine tuning argument is bogus and should never be used.

[FarWanderer]

[Replying to post 73 by FarWanderer]

yes , thats fine. I do not agree with the premises either. Nor the conclusion. I was trying to help out Instant

And I was just offering my analysis. I had no presumptions about your position.

[instantc]

I have been through this thread and have failed to find a list of premises. Please present these premises you are talking about and the source.

Here are the premises of the argument, as presented in Craig's book on reasonable faith.

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.

2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.

3. Therefore, it is due to design.

These are not premises. They are arguments that follow from the assumption that the universe is fine-tuned for life.

It's comments like this that make me not want to read the rest of your post. I'm sorry but they are premises, that's what they are called in the English language.

Could you please be a bit more precise and specify which one of the above-mentioned premises contains the hidden assumption that the universe is fine-tuned with life as a priority.

For the sake of the argument, consider the definition of fine-tuning that I gave you (the constants of the universe are set within a life-permitting range), and explain which premise is flawed and why. That way perhaps I could make some sense of your objection and see whether I agree with it.

Your definition, that the constants of the universe are set within a life-permitting range, has two possible interpretations. One is that the word ‘set’ implies that the parameters were intentionally set, which is begging the question. The other is that the parameters merely happen to permit life, without assuming a reason for it. I will use the second interpretation.

Take the premise 1 as a mere observation that the constants are in that range. Do not read anything into it.

Craig’s #1 already assumes a fine-tuning. As I have addressed previously, the qualifier ‘fine’ is not well justified. If one wants to say that the universe is fine-tuned for life, one must address the issue that the vast majority of the universe is not only lifeless but very hostile to life.

No, please consider the definition of fine-tuned, which I gave you, and which does not contain such assumptions as you indicate here, and feel free to try again.

[Ancient of Years]

I have been through this thread and have failed to find a list of premises. Please present these premises you are talking about and the source.

Here are the premises of the argument, as presented in Craig's book on reasonable faith.

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.

2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.

3. Therefore, it is due to design.

These are not premises. They are arguments that follow from the assumption that the universe is fine-tuned for life.

It's comments like this that make me not want to read the rest of your post. I'm sorry but they are premises, that's what they are called in the English language.

Could you please be a bit more precise and specify which one of the above-mentioned premises contains the hidden assumption that the universe is fine-tuned with life as a priority.

For the sake of the argument, consider the definition of fine-tuning that I gave you (the constants of the universe are set within a life-permitting range), and explain which premise is flawed and why. That way perhaps I could make some sense of your objection and see whether I agree with it.

Your definition, that the constants of the universe are set within a life-permitting range, has two possible interpretations. One is that the word ‘set’ implies that the parameters were intentionally set, which is begging the question. The other is that the parameters merely happen to permit life, without assuming a reason for it. I will use the second interpretation.

Take the premise 1 as a mere observation that the constants are in that range. Do not read anything into it.

Craig’s #1 already assumes a fine-tuning. As I have addressed previously, the qualifier ‘fine’ is not well justified. If one wants to say that the universe is fine-tuned for life, one must address the issue that the vast majority of the universe is not only lifeless but very hostile to life.

No, please consider the definition of fine-tuned, which I gave you, and which does not contain such assumptions as you indicate here, and feel free to try again.

I already considered all of the possible interpretations. None of them work to support the idea of fine tuning. The parameters of the universe also happen to support the existence of the Cosmic Microwave Background, red dwarf stars and snowflakes. Who knows what it might be 'fine-tuned' for if the parameters were different. The thousand coin toss cannot reasonably be called fine tuned yet it is extremely specific in its results.

I have considered exactly what you want but you left out the parts of my post that addressed that. No need to try again. Been there. Done that. Got the T-shirt. The Craig/instantc hypothesis does not work.

[instantc]

I have been through this thread and have failed to find a list of premises. Please present these premises you are talking about and the source.

Here are the premises of the argument, as presented in Craig's book on reasonable faith.

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.

2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.

3. Therefore, it is due to design.

These are not premises. They are arguments that follow from the assumption that the universe is fine-tuned for life.

It's comments like this that make me not want to read the rest of your post. I'm sorry but they are premises, that's what they are called in the English language.

Could you please be a bit more precise and specify which one of the above-mentioned premises contains the hidden assumption that the universe is fine-tuned with life as a priority.

For the sake of the argument, consider the definition of fine-tuning that I gave you (the constants of the universe are set within a life-permitting range), and explain which premise is flawed and why. That way perhaps I could make some sense of your objection and see whether I agree with it.

Your definition, that the constants of the universe are set within a life-permitting range, has two possible interpretations. One is that the word ‘set’ implies that the parameters were intentionally set, which is begging the question. The other is that the parameters merely happen to permit life, without assuming a reason for it. I will use the second interpretation.

Take the premise 1 as a mere observation that the constants are in that range. Do not read anything into it.

Craig’s #1 already assumes a fine-tuning. As I have addressed previously, the qualifier ‘fine’ is not well justified. If one wants to say that the universe is fine-tuned for life, one must address the issue that the vast majority of the universe is not only lifeless but very hostile to life.

No, please consider the definition of fine-tuned, which I gave you, and which does not contain such assumptions as you indicate here, and feel free to try again.

I already considered all of the possible interpretations. None of them work to support the idea of fine tuning.

So your only objection really is that you are not happy with the word choice of the fine-tuning argument.

If I changed the wording in order for us to get past this complaint of yours, would you then explain your objection to the argument at hand? Here you are.

1. The fact that the constants in the universe are within a narrow life-permitting range is due to either design, chance or physical necessity.

2. It's not due to chance or physical necessity.

3. Therefore it's due to design.

[sickles]

[Replying to post 80 by FarWanderer]

Aquinas defined omnipotence as the capability to do anything that is logically possible.
"All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, 'God can do all things,' is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent."

This means that it is logically impossible to create a rock so heavy that God cannot lift it , so God is off the hook. God can only do logically possible things. Anything you could actually imagine. For example, you could imagine a unicorn and indeed a unicorn is logically possible. A squared circle, a real one, is not. So its ok if God cannot create a square circle, because such things can never exist whatsoever. I am not endorsing this view heh.

This gets around the "so god isnt omnipotent then because he is constrained by the laws of physics."

[Ancient of Years]

I have been through this thread and have failed to find a list of premises. Please present these premises you are talking about and the source.

Here are the premises of the argument, as presented in Craig's book on reasonable faith.

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.

2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.

3. Therefore, it is due to design.

These are not premises. They are arguments that follow from the assumption that the universe is fine-tuned for life.

It's comments like this that make me not want to read the rest of your post. I'm sorry but they are premises, that's what they are called in the English language.

Could you please be a bit more precise and specify which one of the above-mentioned premises contains the hidden assumption that the universe is fine-tuned with life as a priority.

For the sake of the argument, consider the definition of fine-tuning that I gave you (the constants of the universe are set within a life-permitting range), and explain which premise is flawed and why. That way perhaps I could make some sense of your objection and see whether I agree with it.

Your definition, that the constants of the universe are set within a life-permitting range, has two possible interpretations. One is that the word ‘set’ implies that the parameters were intentionally set, which is begging the question. The other is that the parameters merely happen to permit life, without assuming a reason for it. I will use the second interpretation.

Take the premise 1 as a mere observation that the constants are in that range. Do not read anything into it.

Craig’s #1 already assumes a fine-tuning. As I have addressed previously, the qualifier ‘fine’ is not well justified. If one wants to say that the universe is fine-tuned for life, one must address the issue that the vast majority of the universe is not only lifeless but very hostile to life.

No, please consider the definition of fine-tuned, which I gave you, and which does not contain such assumptions as you indicate here, and feel free to try again.

I already considered all of the possible interpretations. None of them work to support the idea of fine tuning.

So your only objection really is that you are not happy with the word choice of the fine-tuning argument.

If I changed the wording in order for us to get past this complaint of yours, would you then explain your objection to the argument at hand? Here you are.

1. The fact that the constants in the universe are within a narrow life-permitting range is due to either design, chance or physical necessity.

2. It's not due to chance or physical necessity.

3. Therefore it's due to design.

No, not the word choice. Duh! The constants in the universe are in a narrow star-permitting range. Stars are very common. Life is just barely allowed by the constants and requires many other very uncommon circumstances. If there is a design it is not for life. And please no more nonsense about a creator who intentionally designed a universe that just barely allows life in tiny little corners while making the rest of the universe utterly inimical to life.

The fact that life exists at all is obviously a matter of chance, the very rare side-effect of the uncommon juxtaposition of circumstances that sometimes results from the much much more common character of the universe.

In the thousand coin toss experiment, which you neglected to quote or respond to, one expects to find patterns here and there that by themselves would be remarkable, like a dozen heads in a row someplace. A circumstance that would be unusual by itself can be expected to happen by chance in a large random distribution. If it were by design it would occur much more often than by chance.

In the multiverse scenario, which you neglected to quote or respond to, among those universes able to support something that requires complex circumstances to exist, one would expect it to be a rarity in the great majority of such universes. Just like it is a rarity in this universe. Considering that we know without doubt that physical things exist but we do not have any direct evidence of non-physical things, a multiverse comprising all possible physical universes would appear a more likely solution than a non-physical entity designer whose motives are very unclear.

It would appear that the only way to defend the fine-tuning argument is to pretend counter-arguments do not exist.

[instantc]

The fact that life exists at all is obviously a matter of chance, the very rare side-effect of the uncommon juxtaposition of circumstances that sometimes results from the much much more common character of the universe.

In the thousand coin toss experiment, which you neglected to quote or respond to, one expects to find patterns here and there that by themselves would be remarkable, like a dozen heads in a row someplace. A circumstance that would be unusual by itself can be expected to happen by chance in a large random distribution. If it were by design it would occur much more often than by chance.

In the multiverse scenario, which you neglected to quote or respond to, among those universes able to support something that requires complex circumstances to exist, one would expect it to be a rarity in the great majority of such universes. Just like it is a rarity in this universe. Considering that we know without doubt that physical things exist but we do not have any direct evidence of non-physical things, a multiverse comprising all possible physical universes would appear a more likely solution than a non-physical entity designer whose motives are very unclear.

It would appear that the only way to defend the fine-tuning argument is to pretend counter-arguments do not exist.

Ok, so in short you object to the second premise on grounds that 'chance' is a plausible explanation, if we posit the existence of every possible universe. I am in agreement here.

Wouldn't you agree though, that surely a designer, without presuming any specific properties, is a more parsimonious hypothesis than the existence of every single possible universe (which amount to trillions, obviously)?

Your argument that a multiverse is more likely than a creator seems like sheer speculation to me. On what basis do you make such a probability calculation?

[Ancient of Years]

The fact that life exists at all is obviously a matter of chance, the very rare side-effect of the uncommon juxtaposition of circumstances that sometimes results from the much much more common character of the universe.

In the thousand coin toss experiment, which you neglected to quote or respond to, one expects to find patterns here and there that by themselves would be remarkable, like a dozen heads in a row someplace. A circumstance that would be unusual by itself can be expected to happen by chance in a large random distribution. If it were by design it would occur much more often than by chance.

In the multiverse scenario, which you neglected to quote or respond to, among those universes able to support something that requires complex circumstances to exist, one would expect it to be a rarity in the great majority of such universes. Just like it is a rarity in this universe. Considering that we know without doubt that physical things exist but we do not have any direct evidence of non-physical things, a multiverse comprising all possible physical universes would appear a more likely solution than a non-physical entity designer whose motives are very unclear.

It would appear that the only way to defend the fine-tuning argument is to pretend counter-arguments do not exist.

Ok, so in short you object to the second premise on grounds that 'chance' is a plausible explanation, if we posit the existence of every possible universe. I am in agreement here.

Wouldn't you agree though, that surely a designer, without presuming any specific properties, is a more parsimonious hypothesis than the existence of every single possible universe (which amount to trillions, obviously)?

Your argument that a multiverse is more likely than a creator seems like sheer speculation to me. On what basis do you make such a probability calculation?

That is not quite right. Given only this universe, the existence of life, as rare as it is and requiring rare circumstances, is more explainable by chance than design. Insisting the universe is fine-tuned for life is not supportable and betrays the desire to build in the desired conclusion at the beginning.

The values of the constants and even the existence of this particular set of constants are more explainable by a multiverse than by a creator We know physical things exist. We do not know non-physical things exist. The very poor fit of life as the reason for the nature of the universe removes the connection to a living non-physical entity that just happens to be conscious, intelligent, volitional and has motives - just like us.

Postulating a multiverse comprising all possible universes has advantages. It allows a definition of existence. What does it mean for something to be? It is to be part of a universe. What is a universe? The embodiment of a coherent, consistent and complete possibility. To be is simply to be possible. In this scenario no explanation is needed for why a particular universe exists. They all exist.

This is not prolific but maximally parsimonious. It is the natural result of the simple rule that to be is to be possible. No pre-existing limitations or conditions that would themselves need explanation for why they are the way they are. And no explanation is needed for why a creator should be conscious, intelligent, volitional and have specific motives as opposed to any other possible properties. Without those properties it is not possible to assign the label of designer.

I am not claiming that the multiverse is real, only that it provides a better explanation for why things the way they are than a creator.

[sickles]

God and parsimonious should never be in the same sentence together. It makes me puke a little.

[FarWanderer]

[Replying to post 80 by FarWanderer]

Aquinas defined omnipotence as the capability to do anything that is logically possible.
"All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, 'God can do all things,' is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent."

This means that it is logically impossible to create a rock so heavy that God cannot lift it , so God is off the hook. God can only do logically possible things. Anything you could actually imagine. For example, you could imagine a unicorn and indeed a unicorn is logically possible. A squared circle, a real one, is not. So its ok if God cannot create a square circle, because such things can never exist whatsoever. I am not endorsing this view heh.

I am familiar with this definition/interpretation of "omnipotence". I just didn't know it came from Aquinas.

You may not endorse it, but I think it's fine myself.

This gets around the "so god isnt omnipotent then because he is constrained by the laws of physics."

I don't see how.