What are the strongest arguments for atheism?

[harvey1]

You know, come to think of it. I haven't seen any arguments that support the atheist claim that God doesn't exist. Why is that? So, let's turn the tables for a second, and ask, what are the strongest arguments in support of atheism?

Btw, don't bother answering if you either don't have an argument or don't feel that you are required to support your philosophical position.

[harvey1]

AAARRRGGGH! <great hair-pulling, gnashing of teeth, etc>

We have different concepts of criteria. My idea of a criterion is much more of a go or no-go function. You either met the criterion or you didn't. What you provided is a principle of rationality. I wouldn't call it a criterion as is used in science and just about every field where people are making specific judgement calls on if a test has been met. See for example:

Criterion: A standard by means of which to judge the features of things. Possession of appropriate criteria necessarily constitutes adequate evidence for our attribution of the feature in question. Thus, as Wittgenstein noted, for example, observation of writhing and groaning are criteria for our belief that someone is in pain.

Question 8: Do you think that a belief is more 'reasonable to believe' if the major experts in the field in question are nearly unanamous in their support of that belief (besides for a few questionable quacks in the field)?

Yes, generally that is a good reason to believe, all else being equal. (And that's so because the simplest and best explanation of such unanimity is that the experts have converged on something at least close to true; so like logic, again acceptance of expert testimony is derivative of my criteria for rationality.)

Good! We are making slow and steady progress at your local debatingchristianity dentist office. How about another easy one...

Question 9: If a belief has tangible evidence that is related to the claim of the proposition (e.g., you can see a phenomena claimed in the proposition, read a document that verifies the proposition, etc), then do you think that belief is more reasonable to believe?

[spetey]

Last post before bedtime... we were both very busy today, Harvey!

I wouldn't call it a criterion as is used in science and just about every field where people are making specific judgement calls on if a test has been met.

You think scientists don't judge theories by whether they explain the observations and are simple? You think that's not a "standard by means of which to judge" the goodness or badness of a scientific theory? You think that a scientific theory that posits extra and unneeded entities and concepts is better, perhaps? You would prefer M-theory plus invisible pixies that do no work to plain M-theory? Or perhaps you think that M-theory should be rejected because it explains a wide range of observations really well, and that's a bad thing?

Question 9: If a belief has tangible evidence that is related to the claim of the proposition (e.g., you can see a phenomena claimed in the proposition, read a document that verifies the proposition, etc), then do you think that belief is more reasonable to believe?

Yes, but again trivially; "evidence" is just stuff that gives a good reason to believe. I don't, of course, think that just "reading a document" automatically counts as evidence, for example. It would depend a great deal on what that document said, and what other related documents said, and so on.


spetey

[harvey1]

I wouldn't call it a criterion as is used in science and just about every field where people are making specific judgement calls on if a test has been met.

You think scientists don't judge theories by whether they explain the observations and are simple? You think that's not a "standard by means of which to judge" the goodness or badness of a scientific theory? You think that a scientific theory that posits extra and unneeded entities and concepts is better, perhaps? You would prefer M-theory plus invisible pixies that do no work to plain M-theory? Or perhaps you think that M-theory should be rejected because it explains a wide range of observations really well, and that's a bad thing?

According to Weinberg:

"It's often a good strategy to study simple theories before you study complicated theories because it's easier to see how they work, but for the purpose of physics is to find out why nature is the way it is, and simplicity by itself is I think never the answer." (p. 4)

I think you will agree with this quote, as I do also. The key, though, is that simplicity - as great a tool as it is - does not tell you if something is reasonable to believe; rather, it is just an aesthetic criterion versus a methodological-based criterion used between scientists to decide if a theory is reasonable or not.

Question 9: If a belief has tangible evidence that is related to the claim of the proposition (e.g., you can see a phenomena claimed in the proposition, read a document that verifies the proposition, etc), then do you think that belief is more reasonable to believe?

Yes, but again trivially; "evidence" is just stuff that gives a good reason to believe. I don't, of course, think that just "reading a document" automatically counts as evidence, for example. It would depend a great deal on what that document said, and what other related documents said, and so on.

That's understandable. However, if there is tangible evidence for a belief in the appropriate context, verifiable with other docs, etc, then we can say that the belief has met that particular criterion for something that is reasonable to believe, right?

Now...

Question 10: Do you think a belief is more reasonable to believe if it based on a few very straightforward principles observed or consistent with what we know about in nature - versus a large number of premises needed to construct the belief? For example, Einstein was able to construct special relativity on two principles or postulates: the speed of light in a vacuum as invariant with respect to an inertial frame of reference, and the principle of relativity. This contrasts with the view of the IPU which, as far as we know, require many basic principles or postulates to be true before we could entertain the IPU being correct.

[spetey]

The key, though, is that simplicity - as great a tool as it is - does not tell you if something is reasonable to believe; rather, it is just an aesthetic criterion versus a methodological-based criterion used between scientists to decide if a theory is reasonable or not.

Of course it doesn't tell you alone. It must work in concert with fitting the data. And what is it to say that it's "just an aesthetic criterion versus a methodological-based criterion"? It is a criterion scientists use in the scientific method. In that sense it's a methodological criterion. (I don't know what it is to be a "methodological-based criterion".) That's why they don't posit M-theory-plus-pixies as an explanation, they just posit M-theory. Do you agree with this criterion, or not? If you do, let's move on. You have still to tell me what's wrong with my reasons for being an atheist.

Question 10: Do you think a belief is more reasonable to believe if it based on a few very straightforward principles observed or consistent with what we know about in nature - versus a large number of premises needed to construct the belief?

Do you really have to ask me whether I prefer (ceteris paribus) simpler theories, Harvey?! I don't know how much clearer I can be after my last post, I really don't. Are you still honestly confused about whether I like simplicity and data fit? I'm really not confident that if I tell you this time again that I choose explanations based on these criteria that you'll remember it or believe it, since you've failed to the last 10 or so times. But just in case:

• I prefer explanations to the extent that they are simpler and fit the data well; I think such explanations are reasonable to believe.

spetey

[harvey1]

The key, though, is that simplicity - as great a tool as it is - does not tell you if something is reasonable to believe; rather, it is just an aesthetic criterion versus a methodological-based criterion used between scientists to decide if a theory is reasonable or not.

Of course it doesn't tell you alone. It must work in concert with fitting the data.

Oversimplification. 'Nuff said.

And what is it to say that it's "just an aesthetic criterion versus a methodological-based criterion"? It is a criterion scientists use in the scientific method. In that sense it's a methodological criterion. (I don't know what it is to be a "methodological-based criterion".) That's why they don't posit M-theory-plus-pixies as an explanation, they just posit M-theory. Do you agree with this criterion, or not? If you do, let's move on.

What I mean by methodological criteria is material criteria that are used in science that are actually explicit with regard to scientific hypotheses (versus implicit criteria).

You have still to tell me what's wrong with my reasons for being an atheist.

Without asking you on any particular piece of evidence, how do I know you won't interpret that evidence as simple/data-fitting? You want to be the final arbitrator of the evidence as it is cited and that's like asking O.J. to find "who did it." I want to avoid any needless waste of time.

Question 10: Do you think a belief is more reasonable to believe if it based on a few very straightforward principles observed or consistent with what we know about in nature - versus a large number of premises needed to construct the belief?

Do you really have to ask me whether I prefer (ceteris paribus) simpler theories, Harvey?! I don't know how much clearer I can be after my last post, I really don't. Are you still honestly confused about whether I like simplicity and data fit? I'm really not confident that if I tell you this time again that I choose explanations based on these criteria that you'll remember it or believe it, since you've failed to the last 10 or so times. But just in case: I prefer explanations to the extent that they are simpler and fit the data well; I think such explanations are reasonable to believe

Yes, I have to ask because you have chosen to interpret simplicity in each and every situation the way you see fit. I want to know some very specific things about what can constitute or is a reasonable belief. Not something vague and ethereal. Yes or no. Yeah or neigh. Up or down. Paper or plastic. I'm not looking for a philosophical debate each time I state a piece of evidence. It should be a simple matter of stating the evidence and making a simple conclusion if it is reasonable to believe or not based on the criteria you've chosen. So, I can't assume anything.

Question 11: In the case of the IPU, to construct this view one should require not only a number of postulates to be true, but also there should be an assumption that something metaphysical can cause something material. Do you believe that in some instances it is reasonable to believe that something metaphysical can cause something material?

[spetey]

Question 11: In the case of the IPU, to construct this view one should require not only a number of postulates to be true, but also there should be an assumption that something metaphysical can cause something material. Do you believe that in some instances it is reasonable to believe that something metaphysical can cause something material?

I don't know what you mean by "something metaphysical". Is a chair "metaphysical"? How about the number 17?

I don't see how something immaterial, as I suppose the IPU is, can affect things material. Since I've never heard a good explanation of such a mechanism, and since purely material explanations have turned out fully adequate time and time again, I think I have IBE reasons not to posit immaterial substances--if that's what you're asking.


spetey

[harvey1]

Question 11: In the case of the IPU, to construct this view one should require not only a number of postulates to be true, but also there should be an assumption that something metaphysical can cause something material. Do you believe that in some instances it is reasonable to believe that something metaphysical can cause something material?

I don't know what you mean by "something metaphysical". Is a chair "metaphysical"? How about the number 17?

It all depends on what you mean by chair or what you mean by the number 17. If you mean that chairs actually exist as objects, that is, it is a universal; then, yes, I think chairs as a universal would qualify as a metaphysical object. If you mean the number 17 exists as some sort of platonic object, then, yes, you are referring to a metaphysical object.

I don't see how something immaterial, as I suppose the IPU is, can affect things material. Since I've never heard a good explanation of such a mechanism, and since purely material explanations have turned out fully adequate time and time again, I think I have IBE reasons not to posit immaterial substances--if that's what you're asking.

Good, we are making progress. We have found a key issue that separates us in our criteria since my criteria makes no prescriptive rules for what is necessarily reasonable for reality to be - whereas I see that you do. At this point, it only makes sense to focus on this particular criterion due to the major implications of your view. It would seem that you can't possibly be even an agnostic with this view. So, for now, let's leave the subject on what criteria is needed to decide if something is reasonable and discuss why this particular criterion strikes you as reasonable.

Question 12: If only "purely material explanations have turned out fully adequate time and time again" and you have "IBE reasons not to posit immaterial substances", then aren't you assuming atheism in your premise and therefore you can't help but be an atheist in your conclusion? That is, your logic is as such:

• P1) Only "purely material explanations have turned out fully adequate time and time again"and we have "IBE reasons not to posit immaterial substances"
  
  Hence,
  
  2) God cannot exist
  
  C3) God does not exist since (2) forbids it

[spetey]

I can't resist responding to this post before I sleep.

I don't see how something immaterial, as I suppose the IPU is, can affect things material. Since I've never heard a good explanation of such a mechanism, and since purely material explanations have turned out fully adequate time and time again, I think I have IBE reasons not to posit immaterial substances--if that's what you're asking.

Good, we are making progress. We have found a key issue that separates us in our criteria since my criteria makes no prescriptive rules for what is necessarily reasonable for reality to be - whereas I see that you do.

Again, you shouldn't immediately assume that we don't share criteria. Maybe we share criteria (since you too seem to like data-fit and simplicity) and we don't agree about their application to this case. If you have a beef with IBE, have at it; if not, let's see how IBE applies.

Question 12: If only "purely material explanations have turned out fully adequate time and time again" and you have "IBE reasons not to posit immaterial substances", then aren't you assuming atheism in your premise and therefore you can't help but be an atheist in your conclusion?

No. My premise: explanations are adequete without positing immaterial entities. Among my conclusions from this premise: there is no IPU, and no God. The conclusions follow from the premise by inference to the best explanation.

P1) Only "purely material explanations have turned out fully adequate time and time again"and we have "IBE reasons not to posit immaterial substances"

Hence,

2) God cannot exist

C3) God does not exist since (2) forbids it

This is a terribly uncharitable reading, since as you say it obviously begs the question. Why not make P1 the premise and 2 the conclusion, and forget C3? Then it is not question-begging. And after all, you put a "hence" between P1 and 2, seeming to indicate you think there is some relationship between them other than two premises. (Also, to split hairs in case it's important later, I conclude that God does not exist, not the stronger modal claim that God cannot exist.)

In the meantime, I am curious--you said earlier you were an "a-pinkyist". That is, you believe there is no IPU, and presumably you have reasons for this belief. Could I ask what they are?


spetey

[harvey1]

My premise: explanations are adequete without positing immaterial entities. Among my conclusions from this premise: there is no IPU, and no God. The conclusions follow from the premise by inference to the best explanation.

Before we talk about immaterial entities, I want to focus on whether it is reasonable to believe that something metaphysical can cause something material. Therefore, let's talk about whether it is reasonable for something to come to exist in order to conform to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.

Question 13: If something can come to exist from nothing and do so according to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, then is it reasonable to conclude that particles might come to exist despite the fact that there is no material object that exists to cause the creation ex nihilo?

In the meantime, I am curious--you said earlier you were an "a-pinkyist". That is, you believe there is no IPU, and presumably you have reasons for this belief. Could I ask what they are?

Sure. I use a different criterion by which to rule out the IPU. If you recall question 10, I asked if it is more reasonable to believe something if it is based on a few very straightforward principles observed or consistent with what we know about in nature - versus a large number of premises needed to construct the belief. The IPU doesn't meet this criterion.

[spetey]

Question 13: If something can come to exist from nothing and do so according to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, then is it reasonable to conclude that particles might come to exist despite the fact that there is no material object that exists to cause the creation ex nihilo?

As I understand the science, particles do not come to exist ex nihilo; they are there all along but only represented as a probability distribution across a space; they get represented as particles as part of a waveform collapse resulting from observation, or quantum decoherence, or something like that, I'm not sure exactly. And to do so in accordance with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is just to do so in such a way that we cannot accurately measure both its position and momentum simultaneously. At any rate this does not at all seem to be a case of the immaterial causing the material. Even if the particles are ex nihilo, they are (ex hypothesi!) not from the immaterial, they are from nothing.

In the meantime, I am curious--you said earlier you were an "a-pinkyist". That is, you believe there is no IPU, and presumably you have reasons for this belief. Could I ask what they are?

Sure. I use a different criterion by which to rule out the IPU. If you recall question 10, I asked if it is more reasonable to believe something if it is based on a few very straightforward principles observed or consistent with what we know about in nature - versus a large number of premises needed to construct the belief. The IPU doesn't meet this criterion.

How is this a different criterion from why I reject the existence of God? It sounds very like the reason I reject the existence of God.


spetey