Atheistic Foundation of Objective Morality

[The Tanager]

So, this would be a question to those who believe that objective morality can be founded upon an atheistic worldview. What is the objective foundation?

[The Tanager]

I think that any moral system worthy of that name must eventually depend for its justification on some kind of value judgment; some kind of assessment as to what is 'good'. But that does not necessarily mean that it is not objective. The fact that we may all disagree about what is good does not necessarily mean that out there somewhere, subsisting in the philosophical aether inhabited by theories and notions and ideas and values, there is not a good that really is good, ideally and perfectly, and objectively better than all the other goods and bads we might countenance as goals. Nor does it mean that humanity should not labour away to discover it, this absolute and ultimate good, or at least discover why it cannot be discovered.

For the moment, for the sake of argument, I would merely contend that overall human well-being is a good candidate for the ultimate good, and note that (at least in the analytic tradition of Western Philosophy), moral systems have this at their heart, whether they call it utility, or eudaimonia, or a healthy relationship with (their idea of) God.

Best wishes, 2RM.

I definitely agree that universal agreement (or lack thereof) doesn't have anything to do with whether or not moral values are objective. But this discussion is about whether an atheistic worldview can ground that objectivity. You seem here to be saying something akin to: there could be, I'm not sure how, but maybe we will figure something out eventually. I'm not sure there even could be. What would moral values be, on an atheistic worldview? Physical things? Something like Plato's forms?

I'm not quite sure why you think this. Unless you agree with Kant that morality is determined by fulfilling duty, and not by expressing sentiment. For my own part, I like to do what little good I can not just because I think I ought to, but also because I want to leave the world in a slightly better condition than I found it at birth, and because I derive satisfaction both from that ambition and my activities towards that end. I am not sure Kant is altogether correct in this matter. The moral should remain moral despite and whatever its motivation.

I'm not a Kantian. I agree with your sentiment here. Divorce my talk of a categorical imperative from Kant, I'm just talking about the concept. Objective morality is saying that "you ought to do this no matter if you have a different opinion," that is, you could be wrong in your opinion of what a good action is. That is a categorical imperative rather than a hypothetical imperative, which would say you should try to maximize the well being of others, if you want to be moral, but it's okay if you don't want to be moral.

If you ask me, any proposed moral imperative should be a double hit: eg., You should at all times do what you believe to be good, and right, and just, and kind, etc, and you should at all times strive to understand what is good, and right, and just, and kind, etc, better than you do now. And I think that such would leave us all both free to do as we choose, motivated by our own conceptions of morality, and improve the world and human well-being incrementally, as well.

I agree we should do those things. I'm not sure everyone freely following their own conceptions would improve the world, though. We have moral opinions that disagree with each other and outright contradict each other. Some people, left to their own freedom, would directly contradict the well being of all humans and bend towards improving their lot at the expense of others. It happens all too frequently on large scales and on smaller scales within all of us.

Thanks, buddy, for pushing me on this point. It is helping me clarify my thoughts.

No problem. Thanks for doing the same.

Premise 1: Human well-being is 'a good thing'.
Premise 2: The more human well-being, the better.
Premise 3: 'Good things' should be realised.
Conclusion 1: Therefore maximum human well-being should be realised.
Premise 4: One needs to work to realise 'good things'.
Final Conclusion: Therefore to realise the good that is maximum human well-being, one ought to work to that end.

I will readily admit that the bare bones of this argument do not do justice to the depth and complexity of the topic, but it will do for now. Which part of the logic might you like to dispute?

Again, I agree with you, but my point is that I don't see how this would rationally follow from an atheistic worldview. Why think human well-being is 'a good thing'? Other species compete for survival, so the well being of all of their species is not a good thing to them. And if human well being isn't a good thing, then premise 2 is also false.

But I do think that one can build an ethical system, not from foundations, but from aspirations. I think that if one chooses to pursue the absolute ideals; the good, the right, the true, the just, the decent, the noble, the brave, the kind, the generous, the moral, the beauteous, etc, as best one comprehends these, one can have a perfectly adequate ethical system without ever invoking philosophy, theology or, indeed, God.

But as for us believers, then we tend to think that these ideals are neither more nor less than the character attributes of a perfect God. The pursuit of the ideals are therefore the approach of Him. But I do not think that one needs to believe that, to be moral.

I agree. I'm not saying people have to believe in theism to be ethical or build an ethical system. I'm questioning if such systems are objectively right, if theism is not true. Or if they are more like personal tastes, a subjective morality.

[The Tanager]

I don't think of morality as working out whether we want to be moral. I think we--the non-sociopaths, the great majority of us who do want the good outcome-- just take that as a given. Morality is about what to do next, about figuring out how to achieve the good outcome.

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding your phrases, but I don't think morality is working out whether we want to be moral. Moral value is about what is a good action to take in a certain situation. It may include considering what the most likely outcomes will be, but I don't think that should be the only consideration. Even if it was, figuring out how to achieve the good outcome would be a use of reason, not 'morality.' Morality is about right/wrong, good/evil.

There may not be anything wrong with sociopaths, just like there isn't anything wrong with not wanting to be a doctor. But, just as doctors ought to control the influence of germs, moral people ought to control the influence of sociopaths.

This seems to be arguing for a sort of moral police. I'm not sure how it fits with our discussion on if objective moral truths follow from an atheistic worldview. It seems a moral question in and of itself. Should we seek to control others deemed unworthy of freedom? We might have good reason to control the influence of sociopaths, but why is the control of the influence of sociopaths something everyone ought to pursue? The sociopath doesn't think it's good. Why are they wrong? Because we don't like it? Or because it's actually wrong no matter which side has the majority vote?

I have several problems with that. I don't know what you mean by "objective"; I think Kant was a nitwit; since doctors don't need a categorical imperative that says engineers and homemakers should be doctors, I don't see why should moral people need a categorical imperative that says sociopaths should be moral; and I can't imagine how a theist perspective could get you your categorical imperative better than an atheistic perspective.

"Objective" means true independent of one's opinions, like the shape of the earth. "Subjective" is dependent upon one's opinions/tastes, like whether you like chocolate chip cookie dough ice cream.

I'm not sure I follow your point here, though. The hypothetical imperative thing about becoming a doctor vs. a homemaker is that it depends on what your goal is. You should study at various institutions for years if you want to become a doctor, but it's okay if you don't want to become a doctor. A homemaker is a wonderful pursuit, and if you want to devote your life to that, then you don't need to study at various institutions for years.

Morality is either a hypothetical imperative or a categorical imperative (if it is an imperative at all...and Kant didn't invent the concept or own the property of this term, so divorce it from what you think of him). If it was a hypothetical imperative we would say that you should do A, B and C if you want to be moral, but it's okay if you don't want to be moral. Being immoral is also a wonderful pursuit that doesn't require the same commitments.

That's not objective morality. Objective morality is a categorical imperative. You should do A, B and C, no matter what you think or want. Using your example, "the sociopaths think differently, but they are simply wrong and need to be changed or controlled."

[2ndRateMind]

... I'm not saying people have to believe in theism to be ethical or build an ethical system. I'm questioning if such systems are objectively right, if theism is not true. Or if they are more like personal tastes, a subjective morality.

Ha Ha! I think, whether we are theists or atheists, all of our moralities are subjective, in that none of us can rightly claim to be perfectly moral, and we all see morality through the jaundiced eye of personal bias. That is something, in my experience, we theists have more trouble understanding than they atheists. But we need to get over that, and learn to work with the intellectual tools we have, however shoddy, and maybe, in the due course of centuries hence, our combined efforts will eventually converge on a morality that really is objective.

Best wishes, 2RM.

[2ndRateMind]

Again, I agree with you, but my point is that I don't see how this would rationally follow from an atheistic worldview. Why think human well-being is 'a good thing'? Other species compete for survival, so the well being of all of their species is not a good thing to them. And if human well being isn't a good thing, then premise 2 is also false.

Well, point 1. Other species co-operate as much as compete. And that goes for humanity, as well. This interweb thing that allows us all to discuss the meaning of life (for example) could not have happened without a good deal of cooperation, despite the fact that we might all compete for resources and mates. In other words, if there is no one left to exploit, the exploiter loses out, big-time. The well-being of the exploited is then a serious issue, even for the exploiter.

And, point 2. My well-being is important to me. With very little empathetic extrapolation, I can guess that your well-being is important to you. And likewise for the whole of humanity. So, it does not take genius to think that if all our well-beings are important to each of us, then maybe the well-being of each and all of us is an objectively justified, social, economic, political and moral goal.

Best wishes, 2RM.

[Bust Nak]

I'm distinguishing between that explanations and why explanations.

I'm saying theism is a good explanation for that those things apply. Just like the good explanation for that the rocks on another planet spell an english word is that an intelligent being laid the stones out. That is a better explanation of the fact that it spells an english word then coincidence is.

That's because you picked a specific example where English words are expected to be the result of intelligence. Coincidence is a better explanation for "why is this random rock is the shape it is" than an intelligent made it.

We can then further ask your question for an explanation of why those things apply. What was the purpose behind it?

We were talking about ultimate brute fact explanation, had there been an explanation for why God did a certain thing one particular way, then it is not the equivalent to the atheist "lets stop here" explanation.

But, what I was pointing to was a different further question, still of the that kind of explanation. We can then ask why that intelligence exists that made those things apply for whatever reason they decided to make those things apply. Everyone has to stop at a brute fact in the explanations for that something is the case. That is the point the theistic explanation stops at. God is the eternal brute fact. That, in this sense, is a stop one step beyond where the atheist you described stops the explanation at. I think stopping it at the theistic brute fact makes better sense because I think intelligence is a better explanation for that something intelligible exists than coincidence.

So what makes it a better explanation?

[The Tanager]

Ha Ha! I think, whether we are theists or atheists, all of our moralities are subjective, in that none of us can rightly claim to be perfectly moral. That is something, in my experience, we theists have more trouble understanding than they atheists. But we need to get over that, and learn to work with the intellectual tools we have, however shoddy, and maybe, in the due course of centuries hence, our combined efforts will eventually converge on a morality that really is objective

I completely agree, although I wouldn't call that 'subjective morality.' Here you are talking about the epistemological sides of this issue (how we can know morality, how well we can know it, etc.), while I'm talking about the ontological side of it (on atheism could there be any objective thing to know, etc.).

And, point 2. My well-being is important to me. With very little empathetic extrapolation, I can guess that your well-being is important to you. And likewise for the whole of humanity. So, it does not take genius to think that if all our well-beings are important to each of us, then maybe the well-being of each of us is an objectively justified, social, economic, political and moral goal.

I'm not sure if that is a rational move. You go from observing parts that are subjectively important to a conclusion of the whole being objectively morally important. You go from "my well-being is important to me" to "everyone's well-being is morally important to me."

But, assuming it is a rational move, what determines who is right in their opinions and who is wrong? Are moral values something physical? Do they exist like a Platonic form?

[2ndRateMind]

Ha Ha! I think, whether we are theists or atheists, all of our moralities are subjective, in that none of us can rightly claim to be perfectly moral. That is something, in my experience, we theists have more trouble understanding than they atheists. But we need to get over that, and learn to work with the intellectual tools we have, however shoddy, and maybe, in the due course of centuries hence, our combined efforts will eventually converge on a morality that really is objective

I completely agree, although I wouldn't call that 'subjective morality.' Here you are talking about the epistemological sides of this issue (how we can know morality, how well we can know it, etc.), while I'm talking about the ontological side of it (on atheism could there be any objective thing to know, etc.)

I don't see why faith matters to morality in the immediate sense. Take a rock. Kick it. It will either move, or you will stub your toe. Either way, it is just as objective for the believer as the unbeliever. And so it is with morality; behave immorally, and you will suffer the outcome, along with everyone else, whatever you believe or do not believe. Behave morally, and you and we are all the better for it, whether you are an atheist or a theist.

Seems to me, faith matters ethically only in the case of influencing people to act morally, in deciding whether or not to kick that rock. So, it's a good idea to make sure that the faith we have influences us towards an objectively moral state of being. But, even if we have no faith, we can still decide whether or not to kick rocks, to be moral or immoral.

But, assuming it is a rational move, what determines who is right in their opinions and who is wrong?

Consequences, my friend, consequences. The eventual impact on overall human well-being. 'tis my circular thinking that a more moral character status leads to more moral activity, that leads to more human well-being, that leads to a more moral character status, that leads to more moral activity... etc. And the opposite, also.

Best wishes, 2RM.

[The Tanager]

I don't see why faith matters to morality in the immediate sense. Take a rock. Kick it. It will either move, or you will stub your toe. Either way, it is just as objective for the believer as the unbeliever. And so it is with morality; behave immorally, and you will suffer the outcome, along with everyone else, whatever you believe or do not believe. Behave morally, and you and we are all the better for it, whether you are an atheist or a theist.

I completely agree with you here. This is asking to whom objective morality applies. We agree: atheist and theist both. I'm asking why objective morality even exists in the first place to be able to apply to both atheist and theist. Theism has an explanation for that (an intelligence put it into reality) which makes better sense than the atheistic explanation offered so far (coincidence).

So what makes it a better explanation?

Intelligence is certainly a better explanation than random coincidence for something being intelligible. If our observation is that some rocks spell the English phrase "SOS" we would rightly conclude that an intelligence made it so and try to help them. That is a much better explanation than to say that the rocks coincidentally laid that way because the ocean deposited them in that fashion (or whatever). Coincidence can explain things like the shapes of the rocks, because the shapes are something random. Coincidence doesn't explain the phrase "SOS" being spelled out in rocks. Coincidence can explain subjective morality very well. I don't see how it explains objective morality.

That's because you picked a specific example where English words are expected to be the result of intelligence. Coincidence is a better explanation for "why is this random rock is the shape it is" than an intelligent made it.

I agree. The question here is why did I pick that one? I picked it because of what we are saying morality is like. An english phrase or the random shape of a rock? Isn't objective morality like the english phrase? While subjective morality is the randomness of shape? Rocks can be all kinds of shapes, depending on each individual rock. But we are saying objective morality isn't like that; it doesn't depend on each individual person.

Consequences, my friend, consequences. The eventual impact on overall human well-being. 'tis my circular thinking that a more moral character status leads to more moral activity, that leads to more human well-being, that leads to a more moral character status, that leads to more moral activity... etc. And the opposite, also.

This was assuming your principle of "do what is in the best interest of overall humanity" was rationally reached from our desires for personal well-being. There is still moral disagreement on what is the best interest of overall humanity. Why are your views there better than the Nazis during WWII?

[Bust Nak]

I agree. The question here is why did I pick that one? I picked it because of what we are saying morality is like. An english phrase or the random shape of a rock? Isn't objective morality like the english phrase? While subjective morality is the randomness of shape?

Surely that's backwards! Objective morality is like the random shape of a rock and subjective morality the English phrase. Subjective morality are mental construct just like English phrases; where as objective morality does not depend on what people think just like rock shapes do not change with people's thoughts.

[2ndRateMind]

...Why are your views there better than the Nazis during WWII?

Because my views would eventually lead to an incremental increase in human well-being, and the Nazi ideology was about hatreds that led decisively to the detriment of that goal.

Essentially, you are asking, why is good better than evil? The truth is that good is better to people who can understand goodness, and evil is what people do when they can't. But it is, I agree, a qualitative, rather than quantitative, distinction. One cannot measure goodness, only appreciate it. And if you are not adequate to that appreciation, all this talk about morality is just noisy hot air.

Best wishes, 2RM.