Why Free Will is an illusion

[Miles]

Interest in free will has usually centered around the affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Some very interesting thoughts on both sides have come out of these discussions, many well thought out and others not so much. Whatever the case, there's been a frequent problem with some of the terms involved, most often those concerning "free will" and "will."

As I see it, free will is important to many because without it would mean each of is nothing more than an automaton, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If I have no freedom of choice how can I be blamed for what I do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given.

Any exception to free will is commonly seen as temporary constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the issue of free will is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think a decent working definition of "free will" is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished.

Those who most disagree with this are the hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused then we could not have done differently, therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic level: Are we free to do other than what we chose or not? I say, No you are not. Free will is an illusion. But before going into why, we first need to get rid of the term "choice" because it assumes to be true the condition under consideration, freedom to do what we want. So no use of "choice," "choosing,"chosen," or any other form of the word.


There are only two ways in which actions can take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, appears to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway; completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that negate any randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless the causes leading to the event had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. There was no freedom to do any differently.

What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, the will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..

Of course this means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. If you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .

Any disagreements?

[Jashwell]

There's no reason given to actually support the idea that you can't have praise or blame with hard determinism.

Well, I suppose one could, but as I pointed out it would be hollow praise and blame.

So you claimed. You didn't give reason, or at least explanation beyond a tautology.

If an entity has no choice in what it does, is it rational to praise it or blame it? Like I said, it's like praising or blaming a rock for where it lies.

"That mountain range looks beautiful" sounds like praise to me. Besides, we blame objects all the time - broken cars, light bulbs, etc - we just don't get as personal about it (after all, blaming the broken light bulb is not as productive as blaming the company that made it.) But that's beyond the point, it seems like nonsense to say you can't place blame without indeterministic free will - deterministic or not, people are still people, people still have intentions, emotions, etc. Why do they need a magic coin in their head, making decisions for them, to be able to be blamed?

Illusions are illusions - does that mean illusions don't exist?

No. Just like peanuts are peanuts doesn't mean peanuts don't exist.

So what's the significance in stating "free will is an illusion"?

It's significance lies in its truth, a truth almost everyone denies. Personally, I don't see living an illusion as at all admirable.

It being true or not isn't significant to whether or not its significant - it comes down to what you mean by free will and what you mean by illusion. It's no more significant than the statements "emotions are an illusion", "thought is an illusion", "touch is an illusion", etc.

Free will is free will, nobody is going to be informed by somebody stating that a definition of free will that contradicts determinism cannot co-exist with determinism. Nobody is informed by calling free will an illusion, any more than they would be by calling the front pages of magazines illusions because photographs of people appear similarly to the people in them.

How does it have any meaning as a statement beyond the statements "pain is an illusion", "feelings are illusions", etc?

????

Are those statements any less significant or meaningful than 'free will is an illusion'?

Why would anyone else consider 'illusion' to be the right word for free will? (especially given so many wouldn't call feelings illusions)

Because it fits the definition.

"A thing that is or is likely to be wrongly perceived or interpreted by the senses."

What makes you think there's a difference between perceiving choices and having choices?
Can emotions be an illusion, or does perceiving emotions mean you have them?
Is everything subjective 'false'?

[Bust Nak]

any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think a decent working definition of "free will" is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished.

That doesn't help one bit. Lacking "free will" in the typical sense, would means you would not be able to wish differently in the first place. If a being can only ever wish for one thing, but has the physical means to do other things, does it have freewill? It would with that definition.

Those who most disagree with this are the hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused then we could not have done differently, therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise.

People blame ice on the road for car collisions the time. We do actually "blame and praise a rock for where it lies" all the time. Are we crazy? Or did you meant to limit what you said about a special subset of blame or praise?

The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, appears to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway; completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever.

You don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate? Isn't this the last refuge for the indeterministic-monists? How else other than with quantum uncertainty, can one account for indeterminism in a material brain? As a monist myself, I couldn't just rule true randomness out.

What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, the will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..

Does it really mean "will" does not exist, if it was a determined? We are still operating under our will, our one and only possible will, aren't we?

[ttruscott]

[Replying to post 1 by Miles]

There's no reason given to actually support the idea that you can't have praise or blame with hard determinism.

...

Riiight...good computer, you displayed your program and ran your scripts perfectly. I'm so proud of you. But you do not handle email properly so you are an evil computer and I will take the hammer to you...

Your definitions do not compute...

[Miles]

Even if they did affect neural processing, it would be so random in nature as to be structure-less. And to suggest these random events would produce coherent thoughts is absurd. They would be no more organized than the stars in the sky.

I didn't suggest that these quantum events would produce coherent thoughts. Nor would that be necessary. I also don't agree with your assumption that everything associated with the quantum world is necessarily "random". It could be correlated on levels that we don't yet fully understand.

Then I'm misunderstanding you. I said "The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, appears to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate," which you disagree with, leaving me to conclude that you do think that randomness does, in fact, have an effect at the superatomic level, and particularly on brain function.

You're assumption that the quantum effects would need to produce entire complex and coherent thoughts has no merit. This is an assumption that you appear to be making on your own without justification.

I make it only because it's the only way it could be relevant to the free will issue. Don't want to posit it as a possibility? Fine.

Then you're going to have to explain how these random events organize themselves into coherent structures. And whatever this organizer is it will be working deterministicly.

This is not a problem for me because it is indeed the macro structure of the brain that provides this function. Where we would disagree on this point is not how to explain this, but rather on whether or not it would need to be deterministic based entirely on the macro structure of the brain. If not, then "Free Will" has been vindicated.

Good. Then I can assume you agree that quantum events, random or not, have no effect on brain function.

Also, in truth, if we were going to go into this deeply we would need to first determine what we even mean by "Will". And then what we mean by "Free". Free from what? Absolute classical determinism? I would argue that our will is indeed free from absolute classical determinism.

But the question of precisely what it is that even has a "will" is another topic entirely.

Agreed.

Don't get me wrong. I believe that the will exists. I'm just saying that a will could not exist in a purely materialistic existence to begin with. So that's a whole other debate topic.

Okay.

Then this will would be at the mercy of cause/effect determinism and absolute randomness, which hardly makes it free.

You are assuming a premise of a purely materialistic existence to begin with.

I'm concluding that the driving force behind what we do is not random, but entirely deterministic, be it materialistic or otherwise.

I think you need to keep in mind that the premises that you chose to accept at the onset can indeed influence what you will then determine to be "rational" when drawing conclusions.

So your assumed premises may be guiding your conclusion far more than you might realize.

The premises influence what I will then determine to be "rational" when drawing conclusions? Not at all. What influences what I determine rationality is logic. As I said, I can see only two ways in which acts arise; randomly or deterministically. Casting randomness aside for obvious reasons we're left with determinism.

And if the quantum world does play a role it hardly makes the will free. It would be directing the will just as much as determinism. In fact, it would simply be another form of determinism; one that acted randomly rather than causally.

And that brings us full circle right back to the very question I posed a moment ago. "What do you even mean by FREE?". Free from what?

If quantum effects can "Free" our choices from classical determinism, then we already have "Free Will" relative to classical determinism. If you now want to object and say, "But that would then be determined by quantum effects", all you would be doing is moving the goal post from your original claim of determinism.

From what I've read, free willers feel the will is free from determinism as the sole agent of operation.

I would suggest that before you even attempt to tackle the concept of "Free" will, you should first have a very well-defined concept of what you even mean by "Will" in the first place. Specifically to ask, "What exactly is it that has a will?".

No need to ask anything. I understand perfectly well what the free will position is. In a nut shell, it's the idea that one could have done differently if they wished. That a person is equally capable of choosing A or B. The fact is, they are not. In fact, no choosing whatsoever takes place. The person picks A or B because they have to.
.

[Miles]

any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think a decent working definition of "free will" is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished.

That doesn't help one bit. Lacking "free will" in the typical sense, would means you would not be able to wish differently in the first place.

Don't know what you mean by "typical sense," but in the sense that it's used in the free will V. determinism debate, Yup.

If a being can only ever wish for one thing, but has the physical means to do other things, does it have freewill? It would with that definition.

A being can wish for whatever it wants, however, the wanting is determined. If it wasn't, wishing would be a random event.

Those who most disagree with this are the hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused then we could not have done differently, therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise.

People blame ice on the road for car collisions the time. We do actually "blame and praise a rock for where it lies" all the time. Are we crazy? Or did you meant to limit what you said about a special subset of blame or praise?

Actually, unless they're a bit daft, people don't blame such things, but sight them as the cause. People "blaming" ice and rocks, as you've used the word, does not suggest a deliberate act, such as those coming from a sentient being. Or are you suggesting that ice and rocks deliberately set out to disturb people?

The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, appears to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway; completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever.

You don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate?

Nope.

Isn't this the last refuge for the indeterministic-monists?

Don't know.

What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, the will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..

Does it really mean "will" does not exist, if it was a determined?

As philosophically defined;

"Will, in philosophy, refers to a property of the mind, and an attribute of acts intentionally committed."

Yes, it does not exist. The intentionality is determined.

We are still operating under our will, our one and only possible will, aren't we?

Afraid not. We do what we do because we cannot do any differently.

[Divine Insight]

No need to ask anything. I understand perfectly well what the free will position is. In a nut shell, it's the idea that one could have done differently if they wished. That a person is equally capable of choosing A or B. The fact is, they are not. In fact, no choosing whatsoever takes place. The person picks A or B because they have to.
.

Sounds like an opinionated assertion to me.

One that I personally wouldn't give much merit seeing that it is coming from someone who can't even explain precisely what it is that thinks it's making decisions.

[Miles]

No need to ask anything. I understand perfectly well what the free will position is. In a nut shell, it's the idea that one could have done differently if they wished. That a person is equally capable of choosing A or B. The fact is, they are not. In fact, no choosing whatsoever takes place. The person picks A or B because they have to.
.

Sounds like an opinionated assertion to me.

You mean an opinion? Okay.

One that I personally wouldn't give much merit seeing that it is coming from someone who can't even explain precisely what it is that thinks it's making decisions.

Obviously you fail to understand that there is NO decision to be made. But that's okay as well. Maybe THIS will help you out.

[Divine Insight]

Obviously you fail to understand that there is NO decision to be made. But that's okay as well. Maybe THIS will help you out.

From the link you provided:

"Hard determinism is not taken to refer merely to a determinism on earth, but in all of reality (e.g. involving the effects of light from other galaxies, etc.); not just during a certain deterministic period of time, but for all time."

We already know that hard determinism is an outdated idea that is not compatible with our modern understanding of physics.

So all you've done here is demonstrate to me that you are focusing on outdated ideas.

[Miles]

Obviously you fail to understand that there is NO decision to be made. But that's okay as well. Maybe THIS will help you out.

From the link you provided:

"Hard determinism is not taken to refer merely to a determinism on earth, but in all of reality (e.g. involving the effects of light from other galaxies, etc.); not just during a certain deterministic period of time, but for all time."

We already know that hard determinism is an outdated idea that is not compatible with our modern understanding of physics.

Ah ha, the Bandwagon argument raises its ugly head. But if that's all you've got then I guess that's all you've got. In any case *sigh*, the reason I said "the only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, appears to occur is at the subatomic [quantum] level" is to acknowledge its likely existence so as to forestall remarks such as yours. Obviously it wasn't a foolproof tactic. Other than this, determinism is in beautiful step with physics. HOWEVER, if you have something else in mind please share. I await* your explanation of why "hard determinism is an outdated idea that is not compatible with our modern understanding of physics."

So all you've done here is demonstrate to me that you are focusing on outdated ideas.

Then I'm sorry for your shortsightedness.


Having said all this. How about a good argument in defense of free will? Got anything, or is it just another Christian creationism stuck with attacking evolution?


* (I await, but don't really expect.)

[Divine Insight]

Having said all this. How about a good argument in defense of free will? Got anything, or is it just another Christian creationism stuck with attacking evolution?

What does Christian Creationism or evolution have to do with this topic?

I am not a Christian. In fact, I renounce Christianity as being the most absurd mythology ever created by mankind. And keep in mind that according to you mankind had "no choice" but to create it.

Therefore, according to you, Christian mythology was indeed "created" by the universe long before humans ever existed (i.e. hardcore determinism).

I also have absolutely no problem with evolution. On the contrary, I'm totally convinced that evolution is how we came to be. I am totally confident that we are indeed just one member of the family of "Great Apes".

Neither of those topics has anything to do with my rejection of your claim that free will does not exist, or cannot exist.

I don't believe in a "God Deity" so that's not even remotely a part of my argument for "free will".

However, as I mentioned before, before you can ever speak of a "will" being free you need to define just what it is that you believe has a "will" in the first place. Or even the "illusion" of having a will.

If there is nothing that is having an "illusion" of having a free will, then what are we even talking about? And why are we even communicating?

And if there is something that is having an "illusion" then how does that fit in with a purely mechanical or materialistic worldview?

After all, a purely materialistic worldview sees the world as being made up of nothing more than elementary particles that cannot even have an experience (much less experience an illusion).

Therefore, I suggest to you that until you've discovered an explanation for how anything can even have the experience of "having an illusion" there isn't much sense in attempting to address a concept such as "free will".

You haven't even addressed the concept of it means to have a "will" in the first place.

What is it that has a "will", or even has the experience of THINKING that it has a will?

You dismiss that as being irrelevant.

I suggest to you that if that is irrelevant then discussing whether a "will" can be free or not is ever more irrelevant.