How do we know what is right, and what is wrong?

[Compassionist]

How do we know what is right, and what is wrong? For example, I think it is wrong to be a herbivore or a carnivore or an omnivore, or a parasite. I think all living things should be autotrophs. I think only autotrophs are good and the rest are evil. However, I am not certain that my thoughts are right. Can herbivores, carnivores, omnivores, and parasites become autotrophs at will? If so, why don't they? If they can't become autotrophs at will, is it really their fault that they are not autotrophs?

[boatsnguitars]

I responded to that.

I think you are under the impression that if you dismiss things (responded), you have addressed it to the point that we - and experts - don't need to worry our pretty little heads about it.

You giving your opinion doesn't settle the issue. Again and again, i see that you are trying to wrap up a complex issue in a nice little bow - and claim no one has contested your steel-trap logic.

For example, you opined that under Theism, and not Atheism, could we know what is Right and Wrong. I have repeatedly shown you that this is false, and - to my credit - since you can't name one OMV, it appears that either God doesn't exist, or your hypothesis is wrong.

You tried to use a philosophical "if true, it's true" argument that a Creator could imbue their creation with OMVs. This fails on many levels - yet you insist that given strict conditions it could be true - which we all grant: if true, it's true.

However, if the Universe had the ability to create OMVs, then that, too, would be true, if true. You can come up with all kinds of reasons why it might not be true, but if it's true, it's true.

Just like a God.

However, the stark reality is that we don't seem to see evidence of OMVs. Not in any sense that transcends what rules we could develop for ourselves as a social species.

You also have not explained what OMVs are, and how they differ from things in a material world. You haven't addressed what they are that make them so special that a God can imbue them: how does "Purpose" reside in a thing? The purpose seems more subjective than moral values!

I think, and this is giving you credit, that you imagine God is a Being much like yourself with a Will to make things, and want things to do things you want them to do. You make a hammer because you want to pound nails. If the hammer you make falls apart, you blame the hammer. After all, you created it! You demanded it follow the purpose you made it for! How dare it mock it's Creator!

Yet, who is to say it was moral to make a hammer, to hammer a nail, to make it imperfect, to expect it to follow your whim, etc.
You simply assume God is perfect and you don't need to consider these things. You short cut to say, "God is Good. It's part of his nature. Euthyphro be damned! Next question."
But, that's not a given, none of it is. After all, if a God did exist, we'd see evidence of OMVs - which we don't. Or, worse, you claim they exist - but this "Good" Being has no obligation to tell us?

We go round and round. These problems still exist for you - and that's just DCT. There are many questions we have about moral values, but don't think for a second you've solved them.

[The Tanager]

I think you are under the impression that if you dismiss things (responded), you have addressed it to the point that we - and experts - don't need to worry our pretty little heads about it.

...

We go round and round. These problems still exist for you - and that's just DCT. There are many questions we have about moral values, but don't think for a second you've solved them.

Yes, round and round with misunderstandings on what I'm even claiming and addressing. I've tried numerous times to correct your misunderstandings. You think they aren't misunderstandings and keep going with them. Thank you for sharing your thoughts here.

[boatsnguitars]

I directly answered the question by saying that we couldn’t know what is right and what is wrong, if atheism is true, a view held by some who were answering.

Let's address these two comments:

You say, "we couldn’t know what is right and what is wrong, if atheism is true", but it's also true that "we couldn’t know what is right and what is wrong, if theism is true".

The simple proof of this is that you'd be able to point to it and we'd know - that is, if a God existed.

But you can't point at something and say, "See that's wrong - and we all know it."

However, if you say, "Hey, it's not my fault that you can't see that THAT is wrong! You are an unrepentant sinner and won't admit to it! We ALL know THAT is wrong! You won't accept my evidence!"

But, you are claiming that only Theism allows us to know if something is wrong - but this isn't true. You may be able to say, "THAT is wrong" and we could all agree - but you can't show that it's because of God. It might be that we simply all agree (and are wrong that it's an Objective truth). See the Gettier Problem.*

You've done somersaults of logic about Creators and their Creations to claim all kinds of things - but you don't address the basic flaws in your reasoning.

We could know what is different from my view and different from your view, but not what the default connotation to “right” and “wrong” is. That is a perfectly moral and on-topic approach to the OP.

Whether or not we agree on what "right" and "wrong" is a significant problem, but it's not the only one you face.

As for the difference in our views, you have to recognize that you claiming that "if God exists, then we'd know moral values" is - as I already addressed many times, and again above - problematic:
1. If God exists, we still don't know what is right and wrong - not fundamentally.
2. If God exists, we still don't know if the things we think are right and wrong are objective or not - we may simply agree on some moral values, and believe they are objective when they actually aren't.
3. If God exists, there is no reason to believe this uncreated Being has the monopoly on moral values.
4. If God exists, there is no reason to think this uncreated Being has the power or authority to create or enforce moral values.
5. If God exists, there is no reason to think this uncreated Being just happens to be Good. (He may have the monopoly on moral values and judges us by them, but It's a flawed morality according to a Higher Standard of morality.) You'll say, "There's no higher standard than God." But that's just a claim. You can't show it to be true. Perhaps God is beholden to this higher standard, or not?
6. If God exists, then according to you we'd KNOW moral values. Also, according to you we don't know moral values - so God doesn't exist - but then according to you, we know moral values - so God exists... You change depending on the weather, or something.
7. Since we don't know moral values, God doesn't exist (according to your logic). Yet, I wouldn't say that. I wouldn't tie moral values to God unless I had a reason - you seem to play the "if true, it's true" game here.
8. If God doesn't exist, it is still possible that moral values exist in some objective sense depending on how you identify them. You simply reject it, but as I said, others (professionals) don't. I don't prefer that line of reasoning - but I'm a rando on the internet. I know my place.
9. If Atheism is true, which really appears to be the likely truth - whether we like it or not - then whether morals are objective or subjective, they appear - by all functional reality - to be something we will have to discuss, discover, debate, and otherwise argue over.

The last point is important. The discussion of whether God has a "No No List" that he's not sharing seems to be just about the most useless line of reasoning we could ever waste our time on. Whether God is this or that has eluded humanity for 10,000 years - so let's find some humility and not think we'll solve it on some backwater of the internet.


* For those unfamiliar with the Gettier Problem:

Imagine that Sarah sees her friend Mary with an umbrella, and Sarah believes that Mary is carrying an umbrella because it is raining outside. Unbeknownst to Sarah, it is not actually raining, but Mary is simply carrying the umbrella for shade on a sunny day.

In this case, Sarah's belief that Mary is carrying an umbrella because it is raining is justified, as it is a reasonable inference based on her observation of Mary with an umbrella. The belief is also true, as Mary is indeed carrying an umbrella. However, Sarah's belief is true purely by coincidence; her justification (seeing Mary with an umbrella) is not connected to the actual reason why Mary is carrying the umbrella (to get shade).

Or:
Imagine that Jack is standing in front of a clock in a room. Unbeknownst to Jack, the clock in the room has stopped at 3:15. At the same time, Jack glances at his wristwatch, which shows the correct time, 3:15. Based on the information from his wristwatch, Jack forms the belief that the time is 3:15. This belief is justified since he has a reliable timekeeping device (his wristwatch) that indicates the time as 3:15. Furthermore, his belief is true, as the clock in the room does show 3:15, even though it's not actually the correct time.

In this scenario, Jack has a justified true belief that the time is 3:15, but it wouldn't be considered genuine knowledge according to the traditional understanding. The reason is that Jack's belief is purely coincidental; he happened to arrive at the truth through a process that was not connected to the actual state of affairs in the room (the clock being stopped).


This is the problem with moral values. We could all agree on a single moral value: Don't kill babies for fun. Seems simple. And we may be right that it is an actual (and maybe only) moral value (whether God is involved or not). But it may be because God wants us to kill them randomly, or with serious attention, or wants them to grow to 6 years old - then we are to enjoy killing them. That is, we could accidentally have it right.

Or it could be that it's a random moral value we all agree on, but is completely wrong. Maybe the one thing we shouldn't do is chat on the internet?

[The Tanager]

You say, "we couldn’t know what is right and what is wrong, if atheism is true", but it's also true that "we couldn’t know what is right and what is wrong, if theism is true".

I did think of one way to put this that may help people who are still confused. What I said was that we couldn’t know what is right and what is wrong, if atheism is true because there is no right and wrong at all if atheism is true. If you've been following my conversation with Bust Nak (or even if you haven't), this is exactly like asking an atheist (well, one who doesn't believe in heaven) what they think heaven is like. The question is rightfully incoherent to such an atheist. That's my claim. The question, "we couldn't know what is right and what is wrong" (obviously in the common sense of right/wrong, not in the "it's different than my view" sense Bust Nak has been meaning it) is incoherent within atheism.

Only to those who can make sense of the question and believe there is a right/wrong can we then ask the follow-up question of what fits into the categories of right and wrong. That question is irrelevant to answering the previous question. Just like arguing that heaven is like X or Y is irrelevant to the atheist who says there is no heaven at all and the theist who says heaven does exist.

[boatsnguitars]

You say, "we couldn’t know what is right and what is wrong, if atheism is true", but it's also true that "we couldn’t know what is right and what is wrong, if theism is true".

I did think of one way to put this that may help people who are still confused. What I said was that we couldn’t know what is right and what is wrong, if atheism is true because there is no right and wrong at all if atheism is true. If you've been following my conversation with Bust Nak (or even if you haven't), this is exactly like asking an atheist (well, one who doesn't believe in heaven) what they think heaven is like. The question is rightfully incoherent to such an atheist. That's my claim. The question, "we couldn't know what is right and what is wrong" (obviously in the common sense of right/wrong, not in the "it's different than my view" sense Bust Nak has been meaning it) is incoherent within atheism.

Only to those who can make sense of the question and believe there is a right/wrong can we then ask the follow-up question of what fits into the categories of right and wrong. That question is irrelevant to answering the previous question. Just like arguing that heaven is like X or Y is irrelevant to the atheist who says there is no heaven at all and the theist who says heaven does exist.

And you are simply wrong. You continue to be wrong on so many levels, because you are a Theist and Theists have no sense of morality because they think it is something that must be determined by a Father figure. That it is something that exists within the figure of a Deity - which is ironic, since this is the definition of Subjective. However, they try to call it Objective because they presume these Moral values aren't for God to think about - he was just "born" with a perfect moral sense. Which sounds to all of us like the "Universe provided them to God" - after all, he didn't make himself! But, then, if the Universe is providing them to God, why not the rest of us? Theists simply wave that off as if it's a silly question. But it's not. If God was granted by some unknown reality that he, alone, embodies moral values - it's hard to understand why a Good Being would not imbue us with the same sense of morality. How is it moral to make people prone to evil if you won the lottery and was "born" Good? How does something Good even create the ability for Evil? Theists simply refuse to acknowledge this, or worse, say, "Free Will!"

For some reason, you can't acknowledge that the same governing force that just happened to imbue God with morality, and the ability to parse out morality could be the same governing force that imbues the Universe, Sentient creatures, or humans, or ducks with that same ability. You simply Special Plead that God is the only Being that can have this quality.

That's is Morals are some special property. If they are simply derived from facts about our objective nature, then we are all able to determine what is right and wrong - as long as we are moral agents: Beings that can appreciate why something may be right or wrong in an objective sense. For example, don't kill babies for fun because it serves no purpose other than fun, harms the baby, harms the family, doesn't provide any substantial reward, and harms society if you think your child can legally be randomly killed for fun.

I'll grant that in many views (though, not all), Atheism does generally lead to the idea that Nature or the Universe doesn't care if babies are killed for fun or not. However, the Universe isn't a moral agent.

Again, and again, you simply misunderstand the argument, misunderstand atheism, misunderstand moral values - because you are a Theist. And, as I have said, no one is worse at understanding morals than a Theist.

This last post shows that you are even trying to wedge in Presuppositionalism, which tells us a lot... Because I don't see how you've acknowledged that, yes, some moral theorists believe morals are incoherent, but not all.

[Bust Nak]

Only if one assumes that a moral person is someone you should not harm; they don’t logically have to and we shouldn’t be assuming that for our discussion.

Even if you don't assume that, it's still hardly surprising that a rule that has built in morality gets lots of agreement.

It trivially follows that it can’t stand alone if it is an opinion. I’m asking why this is the case.

As in why is it an opinion? It is an opinion because food taste is subjective.

Is “food taste is subjective” a factual claim? If so, taste isn’t objective; there is no objective standard to measure “food taste” with.

That's right, no objective standard to measure vanilla, therefore "vanilla is better" not a factual claim.

But we see that purpose does alter physical nature. The hammer has a hard head instead of a cloth one because of the purpose of a hammer.

You only know that from hindsight. You cannot tell if a cloth headed hammer isn't just a really badly designed hammer from it's physical nature. Instead you need to find the maker or dig through the history of its creation.

You are mixing up the contexts. I claimed you conflated the two things (1)the opinion "vanilla is better" is different from the factual claim "Bust Nak likes vanilla better, and (2)The former is not truth apt, because Jimmy is not incorrect for liking pistachio more." In the first, we were supposedly talking about how vanilla is/is not better NOT an opinion about which flavor is better. Yet, in the second, the reason for your answer is based on Jimmy’s opinion about which flavor is better, the thing we were supposedly not talking about. That’s the conflation. You gave an answer to one issue by reasoning from the other issue.

Why wasn't I supposed to be talking about opinion? In both things I am saying "vanilla is better" IS an opinion about which flavor is better. It's not a conflation, (2) is a continuation of (1).

How could you use my characterization to make your point if my characterization was nonsensical? You making a point means you made sense of it.

The same way I could make sense of the question "what's located North of the North Pole" even though it's a nonsensical question?

Ultimately, my point is that me saying pantheism is true doesn’t make it a true (2)...if we are talking about how reality is and not how I think reality is…

And my counter point is, you believing in pantheism does make it a true (2)...if we are talking about whether you do or do not believe in pantheism. So the same statement is both a true (2) and a false (2) which is very confusing, if not out right contradictory. Rather than load two concepts into one statement, best to separate the two concepts into two statements instead.

So what if there would be greater utility? Utility isn’t a good test of truth.

And yet there you were, trying to convince me that you can get to the truth from its utility re: hard head hammer.

How so?

As above, whether pantheism is a true(2) or a false(2) depends on what you believe.

That is still gibberish to me. I don’t have any idea what you mean by saying it. I get you saying its not A or B, but that doesn’t tell me what it is, what it means.

Hence my comment about your struggling to understand want an opinion is. It's a belief, a view that someone holds; and in the context of this discussion, preferences; in contrast with views about matters of preferences.

Yeah, of course, it’s my fault instead of both of us talking past each other because you are the master of phrasing and everyone else, if they use different phrasing, is in error.

Well, it's forgivable the first few times, less so the more it drags on, after I've point out many times how the two questions can't be the same thing.

If moral subjectivism is all about resorting to “you agree/disagree with me” then so would food taste subjectivism, and music taste subjectivism and aesthetic taste subjectivism. As a food taste subjectivist are you simply saying “you agree/disagree with my taste” or are you saying something else?

I wouldn't address a dish of food as "you" but essentially, yes, as with all things subjective, it's about agreeing or disagreeing with me, the subject. I am saying "the taste of vanilla is agreeable." You are a food taste subjectivist, what do you think you are saying by "vanilla tastes good?" Maybe I am giving too much credit when I said moral objectivists understands subjectivism intuitive when it comes to anything other than morality.

[The Tanager]

Even if you don't assume that, it's still hardly surprising that a rule that has built in morality gets lots of agreement.

What is the built in morality?

As in why is it an opinion? It is an opinion because food taste is subjective.

That's right, no objective standard to measure vanilla, therefore "vanilla is better" not a factual claim.

I didn’t ask you about “vanilla is better”. Is “food taste is subjective” a factual claim?

You only know that from hindsight. You cannot tell if a cloth headed hammer isn't just a really badly designed hammer from it's physical nature. Instead you need to find the maker or dig through the history of its creation.

What’s wrong with hindsight. We aren’t talking about predictions but about what is actually the case. This isn’t about us seeing, but about the original purpose actually altering what the physical nature turns out to be. And, sure, a bad designer won’t be able to accomplish their purpose but, again, so what? That’s not the issue.

Why wasn't I supposed to be talking about opinion? In both things I am saying "vanilla is better" IS an opinion about which flavor is better. It's not a conflation, (2) is a continuation of (1).

Hence my comment about your struggling to understand want an opinion is. It's a belief, a view that someone holds; and in the context of this discussion, preferences; in contrast with views about matters of preferences.

What do you mean that it is an opinion but that it’s not the same as “Person X thinks vanilla is better”? I gave that option as one of my 3 and you said “vanilla is better” wasn’t any of those 3. What you say above is that an opinion is a belief/preference someone holds. Well, that’s the Person X in that statement. So, what do you mean by distinguishing that?

The same way I could make sense of the question "what's located North of the North Pole" even though it's a nonsensical question?

So, by knowingly equivocating? I try to avoid equivocations as they aren’t part of rational discussions.

And my counter point is, you believing in pantheism does make it a true (2)...if we are talking about whether you do or do not believe in pantheism. So the same statement is both a true (2) and a false (2) which is very confusing, if not out right contradictory. Rather than load two concepts into one statement, best to separate the two concepts into two statements instead.

So, I say my point is X is not true in sense Y, not sense Z, and your counterpoint is “but it’s true in sense Z”? And you think that is a good counterpoint to make? Addressing the sense I explicitly said I didn’t mean it in?

And yet there you were, trying to convince me that you can get to the truth from its utility re: hard head hammer.

No, I was talking about its purpose, not utility. Did you forget about posts 499/501/501, where we agreed utility and purpose weren’t the same thing?

As above, whether pantheism is a true(2) or a false(2) depends on what you believe.

No, the confusion there is from mixing up which question is being asked. Does pantheism correspond to reality? Does person X believe pantheism is true?

Well, it's forgivable the first few times, less so the more it drags on, after I've point out many times how the two questions can't be the same thing.

My apologies, oh great ruler of phrasings, for not more immediately cowing to your pronouncements on what phrases are acceptable and which are not. I’ll try to do better in the future.

I wouldn't address a dish of food as "you" but essentially, yes, as with all things subjective, it's about agreeing or disagreeing with me, the subject. I am saying "the taste of vanilla is agreeable." You are a food taste subjectivist, what do you think you are saying by "vanilla tastes good?" Maybe I am giving too much credit when I said moral objectivists understands subjectivism intuitive when it comes to anything other than morality.

I say two things about food taste: (1) vanilla objectively tastes good (to me) and (2) vanilla objectively tastes differently to different people so that one cannot say vanilla tastes good (stripped of the “to me”), in the same sense one can say the shape of the Earth is a ball.

It’s (2) that is food subjectivism.

In (1), I’m simply talking about my specific preference. In the same way that I can talk about my belief that the Earth is a ball…not that the Earth really is a ball, but just that it’s the belief I hold...and, by saying that, I'm not a physical subjectivist.

[The Tanager]

However, they try to call it Objective because they presume these Moral values aren't for God to think about - he was just "born" with a perfect moral sense. Which sounds to all of us like the "Universe provided them to God" - after all, he didn't make himself! But, then, if the Universe is providing them to God, why not the rest of us? Theists simply wave that off as if it's a silly question. But it's not.

I think it’s a silly question because how could something that didn’t yet exist (the Universe) provide anything to anything?

For some reason, you can't acknowledge that the same governing force that just happened to imbue God with morality, and the ability to parse out morality could be the same governing force that imbues the Universe, Sentient creatures, or humans, or ducks with that same ability. You simply Special Plead that God is the only Being that can have this quality.

I don’t acknowledge it because there was no governing force that imbued God with anything. This isn’t special pleading because if atheism is true and, say, the universe is the uncreated thing there couldn’t be any governing force that imbued it with anything either.

If they are simply derived from facts about our objective nature, then we are all able to determine what is right and wrong - as long as we are moral agents: Beings that can appreciate why something may be right or wrong in an objective sense.

That’s the is-ought gap. You need to have an objective purpose along with objective nature to know which goal/purpose we are judging the nature against to get the ought instead of just being stuck with an is. Theism is a coherent explanation of how that objective purpose exists. Atheism has no explanation for an objective purpose existing.

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #550]

Why? Why does morality being the result of sentience mean morals must be subjective?

Can you provide an example of a moral that is objective and not the result of sentience? If not, then I fail to understand the logic of your question and it may have to be reframed/expanded upon.

Note that my context has always been in talking about whether human morality is objective or subjective; I don’t believe there is a universal morality because not all beings are necessarily moral agents.

Are all beings necessarily sentient?

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #558]

How could something that didn’t yet exist (the Universe) provide anything to anything?

Natural Philosophy has it that while the Universe (as it currently is) did not exist as the result of organized matter, the matter existed as unorganized potential and is organized by mindfulness, and so the unorganized matter has always existed as has the mindfulness. Thus the provision is explained.