Can science not tell us what happens after we die?

[OccamsRazor]

In another thread Joe Blackbird made the following statement:

No one knows what caused life or what happens after we die, not science, not religion

Is this correct? I feel that science can tell us quite accurately what happens to our body after we die. Am I correct or am I unfairly dismissing the notion of a 'soul'?

Ultimately, it seems that both science and religion (specifically formal religion) each describe in very detailed terms what happens when you die. Does this make the statement invalid or do I misunderstand the nature of Joe's assertion?

The question is: Can science not tell us what happens after we die?

[Cathar1950]

Harvey:

What is obvious, though, is that we live in a universe that greatly favors us being here and understanding the universe, and I find it extremely naive to continue on with the view that everything is contingent.

It seems to me that to believe in things non-contingent is naïve or wishful thinking at best.

It seems that living in a contingent world would lead us to no other conclusion.

Can you give me a real example of something that is non-contingent?

However, I do believe that the natural mind is at enmity with God, and that this does put them in a spiritual no man's land that I think should be pointed out to them from time to time.

What would be an un-natural mind? I don’t see how a natural mind would be at enmity with anything. The spiritual seems to be the no mans land.

[HughDP]

It seems that living in a contingent world would lead us to no other conclusion.

Can you give me a real example of something that is non-contingent?

The existence of God? For the believer, that is.

[OccamsRazor]

It seems to me that to believe in things non-contingent is naïve or wishful thinking at best.

I disagree. Certain properties of the universe can be proveable to be unable to have exist in any other state.

A good example is the fine structure constant. This is often posited in arguments similar to harvey's as proof of the existence of a creator. The reason is that the fine structure constant is so finely tuned to enable the existence of the matter we see around us that a contingent universe would make this very unlikely.
We could argue however that the universal laws (maybe some general unified theory) makes the fine structure constant non-contingent and unable to take any other value (admittedly recent research implies that it is not a constant and varied in the early universe but that is another issue).

There are other constants in the universe that we have no answer as to how they took their values, such as the speed of light, the charge of an electron, the gravitational constant. We can suggest that these values are the result of either 1. God, 2. The Anthropic Principle or 3. They are not contingent.

[QED]

A good example is the fine structure constant.

Ah, good old alpha (137 approx) according to 137.com Pauli breathed his last gasp in hospital room 137 which is just about the only thing I can think of to steer this back on topic This reminds me though -- we really ought to have a proper debate about the Anthropic Principle some when. I'm still working my way through Barrow and Tippler so I've been holding off of starting one for a while.

[harvey1]

A good example is the fine structure constant. This is often posited in arguments similar to harvey's as proof of the existence of a creator.

In what way are those arguments similar? It seems to me that any argument that says the fine constant must be what it is are arguments based on ignorance, whereas my argument is not.

[OccamsRazor]

In what way are those arguments similar? It seems to me that any argument that says the fine constant must be what it is are arguments based on ignorance, whereas my argument is not.

harvey, unless I have misunderstood your arguments, you have been suggesting that if a universal constant, such as alpha, is contingent then it could possibly have taken many different values.
Alternative values for the fine structure constant would have prevented atomic matter form forming therefore the probability of the world we see around us actually having occurred is very small (or even infinitely small). Therefore the only explanation that circumvents a fantastic dependence on chance would be a higher intelligence guiding the values of the universal constants.

Has this not been your argument?

[harvey1]

In what way are those arguments similar? It seems to me that any argument that says the fine constant must be what it is are arguments based on ignorance, whereas my argument is not.

...unless I have misunderstood your arguments, you have been suggesting that if a universal constant, such as alpha, is contingent then it could possibly have taken many different values.

I don't recall mentioning alpha up until this last post, but what I have argued is if the collective properties of the Universe were contingent then the Universe could have taken on many different (e.g., an infinite number of) properties.

Alternative values for the fine structure constant would have prevented atomic matter form forming therefore the probability of the world we see around us actually having occurred is very small (or even infinitely small). Therefore the only explanation that circumvents a fantastic dependence on chance would be a higher intelligence guiding the values of the universal constants. Has this not been your argument?

I think there's a major difference between this anthropic argument for this universe being life-supporting compared to my argument for the Universe having enough potential complexity to bring about significant structure. In the first argument we cannot be sure if string theory, quantum loop gravity, eternal inflation, or some other known or unknown hypothesis is responsible for this universe having the properties that it has. Therefore, this argument reduces to my argument which is that the Universe is either contingent or necessary. I don't spend much time trying to defend the fine structured constant as being constant since I think this is a scientific question. Don't get me wrong, there is significance in the fact that the universe's constants are fine-tuned, but only in so much as that this demands a Universe with significantly higher potential complexity. It's this potential complexity that the atheist often assigns to contingency, and that's where I see atheism unable to do so without relying excessively on luck. I argue that a one-time property set of the Universe wouldn't be so lucky.

[HughDP]

It's this potential complexity that the atheist often assigns to contingency, and that's where I see atheism unable to do so without relying excessively on luck.

To be honest, I don't think many atheists I've met do attribute the complexity to luck. They generally attribute it to either scientific reasons as yet unknown or statistical likelihood within a metastructure larger (or longer-lived) than the visible universe.

[harvey1]

To be honest, I don't think many atheists I've met do attribute the complexity to luck. They generally attribute it to either scientific reasons as yet unknown or statistical likelihood within a metastructure larger (or longer-lived) than the visible universe.

Oh, I agree. However, the larger visible universe is seen, by atheists, as just being the case for no reason at all. That's a contingent beginning since there exists no law which could have prevented it from being different than what it happened to be. Had we lived in a different conceivable Universe, then the metaverse would have been different too. Therefore, it is lucky from this perspective that we happen to have lived in a Universe allowing potential complexity beyond which we can design a program or cellular automata as having.

[HughDP]

To be honest, I don't think many atheists I've met do attribute the complexity to luck. They generally attribute it to either scientific reasons as yet unknown or statistical likelihood within a metastructure larger (or longer-lived) than the visible universe.

Oh, I agree. However, the larger visible universe is seen, by atheists, as just being the case for no reason at all.

That's an odd way of looking at. By many it is seen as always having existed, therefore it needs no reason.

That's a contingent beginning since there exists no law which could have prevented it from being different than what it happened to be.

Again that seems (to me) like an odd perspective. Something which never began doesn't have a concept of 'preventative' properties in relation to its existence.

Had we lived in a different conceivable Universe, then the metaverse would have been different too. Therefore, it is lucky from this perspective that we happen to have lived in a Universe allowing potential complexity beyond which we can design a program or cellular automata as having.

That's not lucky though. If you keep picking lottery numbers for long enough, your number's bound to come up some time. It just seems lucky given our lifespans and the frequency of lottery draws.

I am, by the way, noticing that we're straying way, way off-topic!